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Abstract 
With the adoption of the Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC), the Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) 
and the Gender Directive on goods and services (2004/113/EC), the landscape of EU non-discrimination 
law has changed dramatically. From a medium to advance market integration, non-discrimination has 
evolved towards a genuine fundamental right of equality. However, the Court of Justice’s efforts to give 
substance to this general principle of equal treatment have met political backlash. At the same time, 
while advancing the principle of equal treatment, the reforms have also instilled hierarchy within 
equality. More than sixteen years after the first comprehensive reforms, in a climate of political mistrust 
towards the EU, it is unlikely that new legislation will level off the ground. Today, how has the interplay 
of market-based and fundamental-rights-based rationales transformed the advancement of the principle 
of non-discrimination in Europe? This paper first examines the shift operated in the EU transformative 
equality enterprise, from a legislative and adjudicative focus towards a focus on enforcement, as a 
response to pushback. Second, the paper argues that the interplay between an instrumental market-based 
and an imperative rights-based understanding of equality, underlying this pushback, has transformed 
non-discrimination into a hybrid but effective principle. The third section, however, puts forward that 
the existence and effectiveness of this principle of non-discrimination is threatened by several lines of 
hierarchy within the European equality monument. 
Keywords 
Non-discrimination; transformative equality; general principle of equal treatment; market vs. 
fundamental rights; hierarchies  
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   1 
Introduction 
More than one decade ago, pivotal reforms have attracted much attention and brought about important 
changes to the field of non-discrimination in the European Union (EU).1 At the time, the advancement 
of EU equality law corresponded to an endeavour to ensure equality as a fundamental human right. Both 
at the legislative and at the normative level, the foundations of EU non-discrimination law have been 
shaken. The consequences for today’s non-discrimination law landscape and in terms of equality 
advancement deserve attention. On the one hand, the comprehensive reforms expected to level the 
terrain of EU equality law have failed,2 leaving the ground of non-discrimination law uneven. On the 
other hand, after several decisive breakthroughs, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter ‘CJEU’ or ‘the Court’) has amplified the dents in the landscape, sparkling 
much criticism and resistance. Hence, the transformative effort of the EU to advance equality as a 
structuring principle of society has remained incomplete. To examine the reasons of this failure, it is 
necessary to dig deeper to consider how the normative foundations of EU equality law have evolved to 
sustain this transformation. At the discursive level, it has translated into the blossoming of a new 
rationale for the principle of non-discrimination. The human-rights-based justification of equality has 
gained terrain over the historical market-orientated motivation, manifesting itself through the accession 
to several conventions of fundamental and human rights, and supporting the efforts of the EU to advance, 
broaden and deepen equality. By a merging of the rights-based approach and the economic discourse 
within the greater participation-of-all-citizens leitmotiv, the principle of equality has reached a new 
status, both of instrumental and imperative nature. However, the same political fears and criticisms have 
encroached on the fusion of ‘equality as a means of economic inclusion’ and ‘equality as a fundamental 
right’, leaving equality fragmented and torn between two opposed, albeit not contradictory, rationales. 
The resulting tension reflects the incomplete transformation of the equality monument in the EU, leading 
to the formation of hierarchies that are at odds with the proclaimed uniform principle of equality, not to 
mention a fundamental right to equality. These hierarchies pose problems by creating a scaled protection 
that varies for each of the legislated grounds. 
This paper aims to give an account of the evolution of EU non-discrimination law (economic 
discrimination left aside) from the most recent comprehensive reforms until its current seeming 
stagnation, to identify the actors and policy moves behind this evolution, and to understand the 
corresponding normative shift that has taken place. More precisely, this paper answers the question of 
how and why EU non-discrimination law has evolved towards fragmentation, both in its implementation 
and normative foundations, while the transformative efforts of the EU targeted the advancement of the 
principle of equality as a whole. The hypothesis underlying this paper is that the transformative efforts 
                                                 
 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n. [269722] 
1 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective 
of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22; Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16; Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 
December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of 
goods and services [2004] OJ L373/37.  
See also Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) 
[2006] OJ L204/23 and Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the 
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity 
and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L180/1. 
2  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM/2008/0426 final on a Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
SEC(2008) 2172 [2008] OJ C303/21 (hereinafter the ‘Horizontal Proposal’ or the ‘Proposal’). 
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of the EU to advance equality have translated into new legitimising discourses and legal reforms, that 
have however been curbed by critiques and resistance at the political level, leading to fragmentation. As 
a consequence, the presence of hierarchies create inequality within equality protection, and make it 
difficult to pursue the advancement of a uniform and consistent principle of non-discrimination.3 
The argument unfolds along three main ideas. First, this paper argues that the transformative efforts of 
the European legislator and the CJEU to advance equality as a socially structuring principle have faced 
resistance at various levels. Opposition coming from member States, social backlash, important 
scholarly critique and a lack of coordinated mobilisation on the side of civil society groups have 
contributed to jam the European legislative and judicial efforts towards non-discrimination. This has 
resulted in a displacement of focus from broadening and deepening to enforcing equality, leaving the 
non-discrimination landscape uneven. Second, this paper aims to grasp and explain some of the internal 
tensions and contradictions of today’s EU non-discrimination law. The transformative efforts 
undertaken in the 2000s have been sustained by a change at the discursive level, with the emergence of 
a rights-based approach to equality as a leitmotiv for reform. The fundamental rights discourse has 
presented itself as a normative remedy to the instrumental economic rationale that had historically 
permitted protection against gender and nationality-based discrimination. This patchwork of normative 
foundations underlying the principle of non-discrimination has contributed to the fragmentation of the 
EU equality corpus. Finally, the third section of this paper proposes to examine the consequences of this 
fragmentation by describing the hierarchies that have formed within non-discrimination law in the EU, 
and the problems they pose in terms of status, transformative reach, effectiveness and applicability of 
the general equality principle. 
The evolution of EU non-discrimination law: the incomplete establishment of non-
discrimination as a transformative general principle 
Since the comprehensive reforms of the 2000s, the landscape of EU non-discrimination law has changed 
completely. In an effort to establish non-discrimination as a core principle within the community, the 
EU has broadened and deepened its equality protection. Today, however, the transformative reach of 
the general principle of non-discrimination promoted by the EU faces numerous barriers. This section 
scrutinises the role of the diverse actors in the reform process, and aims at understanding its evolution 
and the reasons for its incompleteness, more than a decade after the last legislative reforms in the field. 
The cooperation between civil society and the European legislator: from comprehensive reforms to 
backlash (2000-2008) 
The efforts to increase the hold of the non-discrimination principle over interpersonal relationships in 
domains of social life beyond employment can be described as the “transformative” nature of equality, 
in the words of Muir.4 The history of the transformative function of the principle of non-discrimination 
in the EU starts with the battle for equal pay in the middle of the 1970s.5 At the time of Defrenne II, the 
CJEU’s activism triggered a long transformation process from a vertical, institutional equality principle 
mainly regulating the relations between EU member states and their institutions on the one hand, and 
individuals on the other hand; to a more horizontal principle with regulative power over individual 
private relationships. 6  This movement towards the establishment of a transformative EU equality 
                                                 
3 This is not to advocate a one-size-fits-all approach to all grounds. This would not make sense in view of the dramatically 
different nature of protected grounds such as age and race. 
4 Elise Muir, 'The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law' (2013) 5 European Review of Private Law  
5 The landmark case that has established the horizontal direct effect of the principle of gender equality contained in Article 157 
TFEU (ex-Art. 141 TEC) is C-43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (n° 2) 
EU:C:1976:56, [1976] ECR 455. 
6 For a complete analysis on this point, see Muir, 'The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law' 
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principle has been furthered by the important reforms passed in the 2000s (Directives 2000/43/EC, 
2000/78/EC and 2004/113/EC),7  before being stopped in 2008, with the rejection of the so-called 
‘Horizontal Proposal’,8 meant to enhance the uniformity of EU equality protection. 
The reforms of the 2000s: completing the non-discrimination landscape 
At the turn of the 2000s, EU non-discrimination law was thus subjected to a double motion: one of 
broadening with the expansion of the equality protection to new grounds, and one of deepening with the 
expansion of the scope of application of the principle itself. This double move was furthered by the 
adoption of six new directives which codified the Court of Justice’s case law and modernised the field 
of EU equality law. In 2000, two major pieces of legislation were passed: the Race Equality Directive 
2000/43 EC9 and the Framework Directive 2000/78.10 The main actors behind this change are both EU 
policy-makers, notably the Commission, pushing for a strengthening of the equality principle, and 
strongly mobilised civil society actors and transnational advocacy groups working in sync with the 
European Parliament.11 The Race Equality Directive extended the principle of equal treatment to race 
and ethnicity in the fields of employment and vocational training, social protection, including social 
security and healthcare, social advantages, education, the media, advertising and the access to and supply 
of goods and services including housing. It is noticeable that the scope of the directive is very wide, 
affording the broadest protection against discrimination in the EU so far, in many essential fields of 
everyday life both in the private and the public sectors. The Framework Equality Directive extended the 
principle of equal treatment to the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation, in 
the field of employment and vocational training only. 
In addition to this, the scope of protection from sex discrimination was extended. In the aftermath of the 
two 2000 directives, the debate on gender equality was revived and legislative amendments were 
subsequently made to codify and reflect the case law of the CJEU. Directive 2002/73 EC amended the 
previous Directive 76/207/EEC promoting equal treatment for men and women in the field of 
employment, notably by including definitions of direct and indirect discrimination and thus enhancing 
the protection.12 Most importantly, Directive 2004/113 EC deepened the scope of the principle of gender 
equality by extending the protection to the access to, and supply of, goods and services.13 In 2006, 
Directive 2006/54/EC14 modernised and simplified the application of the principle equal treatment on 
the basis of sex, followed by Directive 2010/41EC15 with the same goal in the field of self-employment. 
Finally, in 2009 the strengthening of non-discrimination law was confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty, which 
gave constitutional status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (subsequently ‘the Charter’), and hence 
to its prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 21 and 23,16 applicable within the scope of EU 
                                                 
7 See (nr. 1) 
8 See (nr. 2) 
9 See (nr. 1) 
10 See (nr. 1) 
11 Crucial transnational stakeholders were for instance the Starting Line Group for the Race Equality Directive, and European 
Women’s Lobby for the directives on gender equality. See for instance the important work done ex ante by the Starting 
Line Group to prepare the Race Equality directive: Chopin I and Niessen J, Proposals for Legislative Measures to Combat 
Racism and Promote Equal Rights in the European Union (1998) 
12 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 
76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [2002] OJ L269/15 
13 Directive 2004/113/EC see (nr. 1) 
14 Directive 2006/54/EC see (nr. 1) 
15 Directive 2010/41/EU see (nr 1) 
16 European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/3 Article 21 on non-discrimination states: 
“1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, 
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law. In addition, the EU’s enterprise to promote equality as a human right manifested itself through the 
accession to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2009 and the discussions 
to access the European Convention on Human Rights, which finally failed in 2014.17 
Privatisation and transformation of the non-discrimination principle 
The review of the most recent directives confirms the double movement of broadening and deepening 
of the protection against discrimination. In sum, more grounds are protected, in more areas. This 
translates into the reinforcement of the so-called privatisation of the principle of equal treatment, which 
has started to spread horizontally into EU society, and in some cases ruling over private relationships.18 
This motion is characterised by the fact that more private interactions, beyond the field of employment, 
are regulated by EU equality law. It reflects a transformative function, through which European societies 
are reshaped by the direct injection of the equality norm into interpersonal relationships.19 Not only does 
EU equality law regulate the interactions between states and individuals in the public area as it was the 
case at the beginning of the EU integration process, but it also “modif[ies] interpersonal relationships”20 
between EU citizens in the private sector. Through horizontal direct effects, the principle of equal 
treatment boosts a form of “inter-personal equality”21 within the EU, imposing the equality principle at 
the micro-level of social interactions.22 This is most visible when the principle of equal treatment 
encroaches on private autonomy, notably the freedom of contracts, as can be the case in consumption 
transactions for race and gender equality protection at the EU level.23 However, the transformative reach 
of the EU equality principle remains limited for several reasons. It is first limited to the protection against 
discrimination based on some ascriptive identity dimensions and does not touch upon socio-economic 
status, family status, etc., as national law does.24 Second, a balancing between private autonomy and 
non-discrimination is operated for each ground, and the protection level differs across areas of law and 
grounds.25 Hence, the transformation of EU society through the broadening, deepening and privatisation 
of the principle of equality is differentiated according to contexts and grounds.  
Backlash 
In 2008, however, a proposal for a new legislation attempted to put an end to this uneven situation by 
enhancing the transformative bite of EU equality legislation through further regulation of the private 
                                                 
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited. 2. Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and 
of the Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any discrimination on 
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” and Article 23 on equality between men and women states: “Equality between 
men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not 
prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.” 
17 See Opinion 2/13 pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU [2014] EU:C:2014:2454  
18 See Nobert Reich, 'The Impact of the Non-Discrimination Principle on Private Autonomy' in Dorota Leczykiewicz and 
Stephen Weatherhill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Hart Publishing 2013) 
19 See Muir, 'The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law' 
20 Ibid, 1241 
21 Ibid, 1253 
22 A good example of this is the recent national judgement Gareth Lee v Colin McArthur, Karen McArthur and Ashers Baking 
Company Limited [2016] NICA 39. The Ashers Bakery decision finds discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
a private business transaction between customers and business owners, in application of the Northern Ireland Equality Act 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations (NI) 2006 which are broader than Directive 2000/78/EC that only covers employment, 
and which are intended in the Horizontal Proposal that is still under discussion at the Council. 
23 Reich, 'The Impact of the Non-Discrimination Principle on Private Autonomy', 256 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
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relationships of EU citizens. The Commission proposed a directive implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in order 
to extend non-discrimination to all areas of life.26 It was meant to remedy the existing gaps in the 
protection against discrimination in the everyday access of goods and services – domain in which an 
important proportion of discriminatory behaviours occur – in order to align the protection of sexual 
orientation, religion, disability and age with the protection of race and gender.27 This ambitious reform 
was meant to extend the horizontal reach to non-discrimination rights outside the fields of employment 
and vocational training, where these grounds are already protected, in the areas of social protection, 
including social security and health care; social advantages; education; access to and supply of goods 
and services available to the public, including housing, both in the public and in the private sector. 
The above-mentioned Proposal had the support of the European Parliament and many transnational 
NGOs.28 Nevertheless, this proposal faced strong opposition on the side of certain EU member States in 
the Council of Ministers, notably Germany, followed by a majority, and was subsequently rejected.29 
Although they were initially in favour of the idea, EU member states were worried that giving such large 
competences to the EU would contravene the principle of subsidiarity. EU member states also 
questioned the need for such a directive, despite it following the logic of equality as a fundamental right 
promoted by the Treaties and the Charter.30 Other opposed governments rejected the inclusion of an 
access to social protection within the scope of the Proposal.31 In addition, market actors insisted on costs 
to business to oppose the Proposal. Another factor of failure is, to some extent, the latent competition 
for recognition, resources and agenda-framing among identity-based activist groups. For instance, at the 
margin some gender activists had expressed concerns that the multiplication of grounds would decrease 
the political importance and the resources devoted until then to gender equality.  
This double backlash – both at the EU member States’ level and at the civil society level (notably by 
German private lawyers) – against the efforts to promote and protect equality within the single market 
has put a first stop to the integration in this domain. This deadlock has still not been overcome today, in 
a time where opposition and resistance grow along the lines of rising EU scepticism and a conservative 
right-wing turn in the member states’ polites.32 The formula of the 2000s does not seem a successful 
counter-recipe anymore. There is no agreement about the future and the direction to take in the fight 
                                                 
26  See (nr. 2) and see also Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Council directive on 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation [2008] SEC(2008) 2180. Even if the rhetoric is about a general principle of non-discrimination in “all areas of 
life”, the EU has a limited scope of competence (i.e. labour and consumption). 
27 The willingness to extend the protection also translated into the integration of fundamental rights conventions into the EU 
legal order. For instance, the EU became party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2009 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights became binding the same year. 
28 For instance: AGE Platform Europe, Amnesty International European Institutions Office, European Disability Forum, 
European Network Against Racism, Social Platform, The European Network on Religion and Belief, The European Region 
of the International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association, The International Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
Transgender Queer Youth and Student Organisation. See https://euobserver.com/opinion/124834 
29 Gráinne De Búrca, 'The Trajectories of European and American Antidiscrimination Law' (2012) 60 American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 10 
30 In addition to this, opposition in EU member states against the Commission’s activism manifested itself further in the field 
of EU gender discrimination law with the EU member states’ rejection of the (now withdrawn) Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth 
or are breastfeeding [2008] COM (2008) 637 proposing a prolongation of maternity leave for pregnant workers. 
31 See Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, 'Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination' in Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca (eds), 
EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press 2015) 
32 This includes for instance phenomena like Brexit, the rise of nationalistic populism in Hungary, opposition to same-sex 
marriage and rising extreme-right wing in France and the Netherlands, the succes of the PEGIDA movement and the AFD 
party in Germany, etc. 
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against discrimination at the supranational level. The scope of EU non-discrimination law, according to 
member states, should not be broadened outside the scope of EU competencies. Contrary to the 
generality of Treaty provisions, of the Charter and of gender mainstreaming policies, the message seems 
to be that the EU should constrain non-discrimination law to a role of safeguard within the realm of 
autonomous national regulatory welfare states. 
The CJUE’s promotion of a general principle of non-discrimination amidst critiques 
At the judicial level, the CJEU has historically been an active engine for the promotion of gender 
equality and non-discrimination based on nationality. Following the tradition of a “judicial construction 
of EU sex equality law” in which “the transformative potential of EU equality law [was] [considerably 
enhanced] through a heavily court-based process”,33 the Court pursued the same strategy of increasing 
supranational governance in the field of equality after the legislative reforms of the 2000s. This 
transformation of the European society has started with the horizontal direct effects recognised by the 
CJEU to Article 157 TFEU in the field of sex discrimination.34 Today, as the legislative protection 
against discrimination has been extended, new horizons have opened for the Court’s activism in the field 
of equality.  
Constitutionalising the principle of non-discrimination 
The CJEU has gone further than just enforcing the new directives. It has given signals that advancing 
equality as a transformative principle of the EU was a priority. Over the course of its post-2000 
jurisprudence, the CJEU has in fact progressively carved out a principle of equal treatment and non-
discrimination, to which it has granted de facto constitutional status. Considering the entry into force of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, non-discrimination transformed into a binding principle through 
Article 21 and Article 23. This added to the previously existing Treaty provisions (Article 2 and 3 TEU, 
Article 8 and 19 TFEU) and made equality a fundamental right. The question that ensued was the extent 
to which, and the way in which the Court was going to bring these provisions to life, and the extent of 
the principle’s validity within the scope of application of EU law. The CJEU has adopted an activist 
stance on this point. In the much-commented Mangold 35 in 2005, the Court has recognised a principle 
of equal treatment based on age, to which it has granted direct effects in horizontal disputes between EU 
citizens or private entities. This is quite remarkable, as Mangold reversed the Court’s reasoning on non-
discrimination. Instead of deducing the prohibition of discrimination from the relevant directive 
(2000/78/EC in this case), the CJEU considered the constitutional traditions of EU member states and 
their common “various international instruments”36 as emphasised in the directive’s recital, as the source 
of a general principle of non-discrimination of constitutional standing. This principle gives expression 
to the directive but suffices alone to produce effects. This stance was repeated in 2010 in Kücükdeveci,37 
another case of age discrimination, where the Court confirmed the existence of this general principle 
and its horizontal direct effects. The interesting point here is the invocation Article 21 of the Charter as 
a complementary source of law. As an expression of the genera principle of non-discrimination, its 
Article 21 is binding between private parties on grounds of age. This was later confirmed in 2011 in the 
widely-discussed Test-Achats38 case, where the Court used the general principle of equality contained 
                                                 
33 Muir, 'The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law', 1241 
34 Marshall [1986] and Defrenne II [1976] make clear that Treaty provisions – but not directives – can have direct horizontal 
effects in the field of sex discrimination. See (nr. 5) 
35 C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm EU:C:2005:709, [2005] ECR I-09981 
36 Ibid at [74] 
37 C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GMBH & Co. KG EU:C:2010:21, [2010] ECR I-00365 
38 C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:100 
Shaking the normative foundations of EU equality law… 
Department of Law Working Papers 7 
in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as the main normative source to strike down EU law 
(Article 5(2) of Directive 2000/54/EC), and therefore granted horizontal direct effect to this principle of 
non-discrimination. This was subsequently confirmed in Chatzi v Ypourgos Oikonomikon39 where the 
Court confirmed that Article 20 of the Charter was an expression of the fundamental nature of the 
principle of equal treatment40 and used this principle of equal treatment to override the secondary law 
at stake.41 This approach was repeated in Dansk Industri42 where the Court used the general principle of 
equal treatment to strike down national law and confirmed its application between private parties.43 This 
signals a change of perspective where equality acquires the status of a fundamental human right and is 
realised through constitutionalising the general principle of non-discrimination.44 Therefore, questions 
arise regarding the extent and application of the direct effects of this general principle of non-
discrimination and its impact on private relationships in the EU. The Court’s affirmative jurisprudence 
thus was a game-changer insofar as it went beyond the directives to ensure effectiveness, a goal which 
might not have been enforced in the absence of this bold judicial interpretation .45 One hesitation remains 
as regards the reach and the circumstances of the affirmation of this general principle of non-
discrimination. It has clearly appeared in the framework of gender and age,46 pointing towards a more 
substantive equality jurisprudence. It has been progressively – but more timidly – extended to other 
grounds, as Römer47 indicates in the context of sexual orientation. However, uncertainties remain, 
notably in light of the inconsistency of the EU equality monument, fractured by differentiated protection 
levels anchored in the directives, that might affect the very existence and reach of the general non-
discrimination principle. 
Guaranteeing the principle of effectiveness in non-discrimination jurisprudence 
The CJEU has made clear that the directives should be interpreted as extensively as possible, in order 
to provide effective and substantive protection against discrimination. This principle of effectiveness 
can be observed through several jurisprudential innovations. In Coleman48 in 2008, the Court recognised 
that so-called ‘discrimination by association’ amounts to discrimination. In Feryn49 in 2008, the Court 
established a presumption of direct racial discrimination and shifted the burden of proof onto the 
                                                 
39 C-149/10 Zoi Chatzi v Ypourgos Oikonomikon [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2010:534 
40 Ibid at [63] 
41 Ibid at [75] 
42 C-441/14 Dansk Industri (DI) v Succession Karsten Eigil Rasmussen EU:C:2016:278, [2016] 
43 This has been labelled as the “subsidiary direct horizontal effects” of the general principle of non-discrimination by some 
commentators. See Giovanni Zaccaroni, ‘More on the horizontal direct effect of the principle of nondiscrimination on the 
ground of age: Dansk Industries (DI)’ (EU Law Analysis, 14 July 2016) 
44 See Muir, 'The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law', 1244 and Reich, 'The Impact of the Non-Discrimination 
Principle on Private Autonomy', 256-260 
45 Muir, 'The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law', 1249-1252 and in particular at 1244. 
46 According to Kilpatrick, the Court’s “constitutional innovations”, observable in the framework of age discrimination case 
law, in fact serve the goal of developing the “contours of a new and distinctive substantive discrimination architecture”. 
See Claire Kilpatrick, 'The Court of Justice and Labour Law in 2010: A New EU Discrimination Law Architecture' (2011) 
40 Industrial Law Journal 280, 283 
47 C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg EU:C:2011:286, [2011] ECR I-03591. In this case the Court 
affirmed the existence of a general principle of non-discrimination as regards sexual orientation, but still adopted a 
restrictive approach, stating that neither Directive 2000/78/EC nor Article 19 TFEU (ex-Article 13 EC) could link this 
principle to the scope of the Union’s competences. See Römer [59]-[61]. 
48 C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law EU:C:2008:415 [2008] ECR I-05603 
49 C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV EU:C:2008:397, [2008] ECR I-
05187 
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defendant. In Meister50 in 2012, a case of alleged employment discrimination on the multiple bases of 
age, gender and ethnic origin, the Court clearly mentioned effectiveness in its concerns.51 Finally, in 
Nikolava,52 decided in 2015, the Court identified discrimination based on racial stereotyping. A few 
further examples show how the Court has pushed for effectiveness across a wide range of contexts, but 
especially in the issues of age, and – to a lesser extent – disability, after historically promoting equality 
on the basis of gender and nationality. In Danosa,53 the Court has rendered possible the protection of a 
member of a board of directors from discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy, considered as direct 
sex discrimination. In Kücükdeveci,54 Hennigs55 and Prigge,56 the Court held that the age discrimination 
at stake lacked an adequate justification. In Rosenbladt 57  and Georgiev, 58  the CJEU declared the 
compatibility with EU law of national rules concerning the automatic termination of contracts on 
grounds of age. This case law evolution shows how the Court was an active engine for the protection of 
the new grounds, and in particular for age discrimination, followed by disability. In so doing, the CJEU 
has not only taken into account the letter of the law, but also its spirit in giving weight to secondary 
objectives expressed in directives and policy documents as a source of interpretation, thus ensuring their 
effectiveness. For instance, the directive recitals, the Employment Guidelines for 2000 and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to which the EU has become a party, 
were cited in Odar in 201259 and the joined cases Ring and HK,60 decided in 2013. The Court has 
therefore used the principle of effectiveness to advance the implementation of the legislative reforms of 
the 2000s, while at the same time putting more emphasis on the protection of certain grounds – gender, 
age, followed by disability – as opposed to others – sexual orientation or religion for instance. 
Criticisms and hesitations: concerns over private autonomy and supranational competences  
However, harsh criticisms have followed the Court’s ventures in its interpretation of the new directives 
and the Charter, especially after the jurisprudential series from Mangold61 to Kücükdeveci62 and later 
Test-Achats.63 The backlash was twofold. On the one hand, in view of the proclamation of a general 
principle of non-discrimination, concerns were raised as regards the autonomy of private parties and 
their freedom to conduct business. The general principle was perceived as too heavy a regulatory burden 
for them to accommodate. Critics denounced the Court’s efforts to shoehorn the principle of non-
                                                 
50  C-415/10 Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH EU:C:2012:217 [2012], [39]: “It is not, however, 
inconceivable that a refusal of disclosure by the defendant, in the context of establishing such facts, is liable to compromise 
the achievements of the objective pursued by that directive and, in particular to deprive that provision of its effectiveness” 
(emphasis added). However, the principle of effectiveness is overridden by other concerns. 
51 Ibid at [38] and [39] 
52 C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisa za zashtita ot diskiminatsia EU:C:2015:480, [2015] 
53 C-232/09 Dita Danosa v LKB Līzings SIA EU:C:2010:674, [2010] ECR I-11405 
54 Kücükdeveci [2010] (nr. 37) 
55  Joined cases C-297/10 and C-298/10 Sabine Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin v Alexander Mai 
EU:C:2011:560, [2011] ECR I-07965 
56 C-447/09 Reinhard Prigge and Others v Deutsche Lufthansa AG. EU:C:2011:573 [2011] ECR I-08003 
57 C-45/09 Gisela Rosenbladt v Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges. mbH. EU:C:2010:601, [2010] ECR I-09391 
58 C-250/09 Vasil Ivanov Georgiev v Tehnicheski universitet - Sofia, filial Plovdiv. EU:C:2010:699, [2010] ECR I-11869 
59 C-152/11, Johann Odar v Baxter Deutschland GmbH EU:C:2012:772, [2012] 
60 Joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab and 
HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S 
EU:C:2013:222, [2013] 
61 See (nr. 35) 
62 See (nr. 37) 
63 See (nr. 38) 
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discrimination into a rigid fundamental rights principle with “strong moral status”64 in order to pursue a 
form of inter-personal equality. On the other hand, many – and not least the member states – were 
concerned about the new repartition of competences following from the Court’s jurisprudential 
interpretations after the reforms and the access of the general principle of equal treatment to a 
constitutional status. Scholars also accused the Court to go beyond its competencies and the controversy 
led some detractors to call for stopping the activism of the CJEU. For instance, after Mangold, German 
lawyers publicly appealed to “Stop the ECJ!” claiming that the decision was “only one of many 
judgments significantly interfering with competences of the member states”.65 Herzog and Gerken went 
so far as to call for a judicial watchdog above the CJEU. For instance, in Test-Achats66 in 2011, the 
CJEU was criticised for striking down a legislative provision restricting gender equality in Directive 
2004/113/EC for being contrary to Articles 23 and 21, thus confirming the centrality of the Charter, and 
of equality as a human right, in EU law. More generally, critiques perceived a danger that the Court, 
through an extensive interpretation of the non-discrimination principle, goes beyond the boundaries of 
Art. 19 TFEU (ex-article 13 of the EC Treaty). The conflict is linked to the fear that the EU breaches 
the subsidiary character of non-discrimination clauses and deprives the EU member states from their 
ability to choose their own measures to achieve the aims set by the EU.  
By contrast, the message of the CJEU seems to be that the full range of rights enshrined in the Charter 
and in the general principle of non-discrimination should be enforced within the strict scope of EU law67, 
and that exceptions must be only strict and narrow.68 The Court, albeit ambiguous on the nature of the 
general principle of non-discrimination, did not shy away from punctually interfering with member 
states’ competences and autonomy to enforce it. Age discrimination cases, notably, were a good 
opportunity for the Court to ensure the general principle of non-discrimination as a condition for 
deepening the integration of labour markets. The question is however whether, if market integration per 
se is not concerned, the CJEU would be willing to enforce this general principle, especially if 
controversial cultural issues are at stake. This limits the reach of non-discrimination as a fundamental 
right. In this perspective, it is astonishing to see that in some cases, like Tyrolean Airways69 and Vital 
Pérez70, the CJEU did not consider necessary to examine the questions referred in the light of the Charter, 
even though the referring courts specifically asked for an interpretation of the non-discrimination 
provision contained in Article 21 of the Charter. In Römer, the Court found the existence of a general 
principle of equal treatment, but does not mention the Charter as one of its sources, but instead “various 
international instruments and from the constitutional traditions common to the [m]ember [s]tates”.71 
These uncertainties have limited the Court’s advancement of a transformative principle of non-
discrimination.  
                                                 
64 Muir, 'The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law', 1253 
65 R. Herzog and L. Gerken, ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’ Published on 8 September 2008 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ). 
66 Test-Achats [2011], see (nr. 38) 
67 At the same time, the Court has made clear that the Charter could not generate new protected grounds or extend the meaning 
of existing grounds. See C-354/13 Fag og Arbejde (FOA) acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Kommunernes 
Landsforening (KL) acting on behalf of the Municipality of Billund EU:C:2014:2463, [2014], at [36], [37] and [39] where 
the Court stated that obesity cannot constitute a form of disability, neither based on Directive 2000/78/EC nor based on the 
Charter, and C-13/05 Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA. EU:C:2006:456, [2006] ECR I-06467 at [56] where 
the Court explained that the scope of application of Directive 2000/78/EC could not be extended by analogy of the grounds 
explicitly protected in its Article 1. The same reasoning was applied in Coleman [2008] at [46] see (nr. 48). 
68 See the age discrimination case law series, e.g. C-341/08 Domnica Petersen v Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den 
Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe EU:C:2010:4, [2010] ECR I-00047; Prigge [2011] (nr. 56); C-476/11 H.K. Danmark acting on 
behalf of Glennie Kristensen v Experian A/S EU:C:2013:590, [2013] 
69 C-132/11 Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH contre Betriebsrat Bord der Tyrolean Airways Tiroler 
Luftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH. EU:C:2012:329, [2012] at [23] 
70 C-416/13 Mario Vital Pérez v Ayuntamiento de Oviedo EU:C:2014:2371, [2014] at [25] 
71 Römer [2011] at [56] and [60]. See (nr. 47) 
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The recent CJEU case law therefore reveals a tension. On the one hand, it seems to engage with a human-
rights-driven discourse – as promoted by the EU Commission –supported by the existing European and 
international fundamental rights instruments, where equality is placed as a fundamental right and a 
constitutional principle. On the other hand, the Court seems careful about the respect of the scope of EU 
law and about future constitutional innovations, in an effort to avoid further controversy. As a 
consequence of this conflict, sixteen years after the main reforms of the 2000s and despite important 
furthering of the protection from discrimination, the situation suffers from the unevenness of the EU 
equality monument and from social backlash. This ambivalence linked between advancing equality and 
avoiding controversy has made the Court appear as a less active engine of EU integration in the field of 
equality.72 Since an important and ground-breaking case law on age discrimination already exists, 
further case law appears more technical and less doctrinal. At the same time, the protection of other 
grounds is clearer in the sense that it does not pose as many questions in terms of national legislation, 
which is by contrast rich as regards to age related pensions and regulations. This produces an impression 
of stagnation whereby non-discrimination case law mainly focuses on age and has been less proactive 
for other grounds. Notably, the Court’s response to AG Kokott’s proposition to recognise and condemn 
intersectional discrimination in Parris has been negative, thus closing the door to advancing non-
discrimination through doctrinal innovations.73 In addition, if the reference for preliminary ruling on 
religion in the Bougnaoui case74  still lets a window open to a more protective stand on religious 
discrimination, the judgement in Achbita leaves no doubt as regards the restraint of the Court amidst the 
current political climate in Europe. From timidity and hesitations regarding future innovations in non-
discrimination doctrine, the Court’s decision in Achibta brings the equality battle to a new level of 
resignation75. National and social backlash has gotten into the judges’ and the legislator’s way, proposals 
to enhance current legislation face a deadlock, and social mobilisation seems to not be enough to drive 
the integration process further in this field. Hence, many shades remain about where the interpretation 
of the new directives will take us, and about the future orientation of the general principle of non-
discrimination in the EU. Therefore, substantive equality, despite efforts to transform non-
discrimination into an effective and constitutional general principle, remains an area under 
construction.76 
                                                 
72 The Court’s decision in Achbita confirms this hypothesis. See C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van 
kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV EU:C:2017:203, [2017] 
73 C-443/15 David L. Parris v Trinity College Dublin and Others EU:C:2016:897, [2016]  
74 C-188/15 Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v Micropole SA EU:C:2017:204, 
[2017] 
75  In Achbita the Court finds the rule at stake neutral because equally prohibiting religious garments and political and 
philosophical signs, hence completely misconstruing the imperative nature of religious dress requirements, of which no 
comparison can be found for political or philosophical beliefs. The Court therefore promotes a biased concept of neutrality 
which in fact only permits cultural identification with well-assimilated Western codes. It is especially clear from the facts 
in Achbita that the written rule prohibiting the Islamic headscarf was adopted ad hoc to prevent the applicant from 
expressing her religious and cultural identity at work. In this perspective, not recognising direct discrimination (disguised 
as a neutral general rule) is equivalent to accepting covert discrimination based both on religion and ascriptive racialisation 
(protected under race discrimination in EU law), coupled to discrimination based on cultural membership (which not 
covered by EU law, but could be understood as a form of racialisation). The only window left open by the Court is the 
indirect discrimination way (which the French referring court did not even mention in its questions to the CJEU), which 
the EU judges however considered justifiable, even though it remains for the national court to decide on this last point. 
76 Kochenov argues that the EU needs a substantive equality principle, which is still missing today although the European 
Commission promotes a concept of substantive equality in policy debates. See Dimitry Kochenov, 'Citizenship without 
Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal' (2010) Jean Monnet Working Paper 08/10, 10 
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The administrative turn of the EU’s fight against discrimination: responding to the blockage through 
a focus shifting to enforcement 
Solving the hiatus between a proclaimed general principle of non-discrimination and an incoherent EU 
equality monument: the policy-based alternative 
The impossibility to overcome the blockage stemming from the combined backlash from EU member 
states and observers has led to the search for a different path. In fact, while no further legislative reform 
is conceivable and the CJEU’s own advancement of a general principle of non-discrimination has faced 
resistance, the European Commission continues to promote substantive equality through different means. 
In fact, the funding and production of numerous research and policy documents as well as enforcement 
reports during the past years bear witness to the institutional attempts to consolidate equality in a time 
of deadlock and interrogations regarding the coherence of EU law.77 These new efforts by the European 
Commission displace the focus from law-making and adjudication onto enforcement and policy-based 
solutions. They reflect a “shift away from traditional judicial remedies and towards renewed 
administrative as well as other more innovative approaches”.78 The enforcement issue thus has been 
occupying the space through several channels: policy reports and expertise about the implementation of 
non-discrimination measures in EU member states (for instance in the field of Roma rights, multiple 
discrimination, substantive equality, etc.), recommendations made to national policy-making authorities, 
research, surveys and advocacy enterprises, communication through awareness-rising and education 
campaigns, training of special instances and employers in member states, etc. These missions are notably 
the mandate of EU equality bodies and the European Equality Law Network, the latter being specialised 
in producing research and policy recommendations. 
The combination of administrative and judicial remedies through the equality bodies 
Today, we therefore face a transition from exclusively judicial to a combination of both judicial and 
policy-based as well as administrative enforcement mechanisms.79 This is part of the transformative 
efforts to place equality at the centre of the social life of EU citizens. This noticeable phenomenon 
emerged after the enactment of Directives 2000/43 and 2004/113/EC, 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EC80 
which imposed to the EU member states the creation of specialised equality bodies in the fields of race 
and gender equality, whose role it is to assist victims seeking remedies, and to inform policy-makers 
and private and public economic actors about non-discrimination law, its requirements and good 
practices. While UK, Sweden and the Netherlands already had equality bodies before, the rest of the EU 
had to implement this new measure. This “new wave of antidiscrimination law”81 however reinforces 
the issue of unbalance in EU equality law. It poses the question of why create equality bodies were made 
compulsory by the Race Equality Directive and further gender equality directives but not by the almost 
contemporary Framework Employment Equality Directive. 82  This administrative development was 
inspired by the US model and pushed through by the EU Commission as a way to secure better 
application of EU law in an era of backlash and blockage. It obtained the support of an “international 
movement for the creation of human rights institutions”,83 seen as an alternative way for poor and 
                                                 
77 See Dimitry Kochenov, 'Citizenship without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal' (2010) Jean Monnet Working Paper 
08/10 
78 De Búrca, 'The Trajectories of European and American Antidiscrimination Law', 1 
79 See Bruno De Witte, 'New Institutions for Promoting Equality in Europe: Legal Transfers, National Bricolage and European 
Governance' (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law  
80 See (nr. 1) 
81  De Witte, 'New Institutions for Promoting Equality in Europe: Legal Transfers, National Bricolage and European 
Governance', 50 
82 Ibid 52 
83 Ibid, 54 
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marginalised people to secure enforcement while they cannot always access the judiciary and the 
political debate. On her side, De Búrca explains this phenomenon by analogy with the US example, 
where political backlash has curbed and shrank progressive interpretations of non-discrimination law by 
the judiciary, so that a novel, often non-court-centred, series of means to promote social justice has 
emerged.84 The creation of administrative organs such as the equality bodies nevertheless does not leave 
the judiciary out of the picture. On the contrary, it also sponsors judicial implementation of equality. In 
fact, equality bodies have played an important role in mobilizing national courts in order to promote the 
enforcement of EU non-discrimination rights, notably by pushing for referrals to the CJEU. Historically, 
the Equal Opportunities Commission in the UK, has served as a model for this role, instigating 
progressive judicial interpretation and enforcement of EU gender equality law in the 1960s and 1970s.85 
This role has recently been taken on by the Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to 
Racism, linked to the Interfederal Center for Equal Opportunities, in Feryn86 and in the Achbita87 case, 
thus bringing newly legislated grounds of discrimination to judicial scrutiny and pushing for 
enforcement.  
Subsequently the equality bodies became a fix ingredient in the efforts to promote the transformative 
role of EU non-discrimination law. The Proposal to extend the protection of the other grounds also 
foresaw the establishment of multi-ground equality bodies before its failure. However, many national 
equality bodies in reality cover more grounds than just gender and race.88 The current trend is to 
amalgamate the protection of human rights and from discrimination within unique bodies,89 confirming 
the shift towards a human-rights based understanding of equality. France provides a good example, with 
the previous Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité, specialised in non-
discrimination and equality questions, replaced by the more general Défenseur des droits, which has the 
broader mission of protecting fundamental rights, among which equality. With this new development, 
we can observe that the EU Commission still plays an important role – however shifted to a more 
bottom-up strategy – in the enforcement of equality through a close monitoring work and financial 
leverage.  
Critiques against the administrative enforcement solution 
The administrative turn towards equality bodies as enforcement and diffusion organs – a manifestation 
of the evolution EU non-discrimination law towards a more transformative right-based discourse – has 
not been spared from the criticisms against the EU’s incursion in daily private relationships. Notably, a 
big chunk of these critiques came from German private lawyers, legal scholars and politicians who 
strongly opposed the post-2000 EU anti-discrimination laws. This slowed down the creation of the 
equality bodies demanded by EU law in Germany. While the transposition deadline for Directive 
2000/43/EC was 2003, many other national equality bodies were set up in 2003 and 2004, the German 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency was only set up in 2006.90 The critics denounced the horizontal 
effects of the non-discrimination rights to be enforced by the equality bodies – gender and race – 
affecting private parties outside the employment field. This was perceived to be encroaching too much 
                                                 
84 De Búrca, 'The Trajectories of European and American Antidiscrimination Law', 19-22 
85 See Hans-W Micklitz, 'The reconstruction of the equal treatment litigation', The Politics of Judicial Co-operation in the EU 
Sunday Trading, Equal Treatment and Good Faith (Cambridge University Press 2005), 165-291 
86 Feryn [2008] (nr. 49) 
87 Achbita [2017] (nr. 71) 
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89 See Bruno De Witte, 'The crumbling public/private divide: horizontality in European anti-discrimination law' (2009) 13 
Citizenship Studies 515 
90 Yet, the German Equality Body, FADA, has a far broader mandate than demanded by EU law. 
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upon the principles of contractual autonomy and freedom. Another set of critiques concerned the dilution 
of equality protection, notably because of shrinking resources devoted to the protection of more and 
more grounds.91 Certain gender activists have for instance expressed concerns over the dilution of the 
gender problematic among other non-discrimination grounds.92 In 2015, gender experts denounced the 
fact that gender equality was in a state of stagnation in the EU.93 In parallel, activists against gender-
based and disability-based discrimination put forward the need for specific directives, realised in the 
case of gender (which has a complete separate architecture), but nor in the case of disability. Some 
commentators deplore the fact that the former coalitions and instruments, the so –called “velvet triangle” 
(EU institutions, civil society, academia), successful in the past, are no longer effective.94 
All in all, however, the turn to enforcement and the focus put on administrative and policy-based 
solutions, with a direct contact to citizens and employers through the equality bodies at the national 
level, confirms the transformative equality hypothesis. Thereby, the EU has found a less top-down and 
more bottom-up approach to enforce equality safeguards at the level of member states by bringing 
together civil society actors, experts, trade unions and NGOs and public administrations. The transition 
from an exclusively individual and corrective judicial model to a more collective policy- and prevention-
based model through a modernisation of national institutions dealing with equality responds to 
effectiveness and implementation concerns. Interestingly, this shift reveals a crucial tension. By 
promoting a foundational rhetoric of substantive equality, the limits of which are however flagrant in 
practice, it seems to be stuck in between two principles. One the one hand, conservative criticisms 
highlight the need to stick with the EU equality law’s historical mandate of market integration, and on 
the other its transformative ambitions reveal a human-rights driven legitimising discourse. These two 
rationales seem to be in opposition and hence to create a normative clash shaking the foundations of EU 
equality law. 
Non-discrimination law: a reconciliation point between market-oriented and human 
rights-driven concerns 
The EU’s efforts to protect equality as a fundamental right show a discursive reframing associated with 
a transition to a more substantive conception of equality through new legislations, court-based and new 
enforcement modi. The story of the principle of non-discrimination is however clearly rooted in an 
instrumental conception of equal treatment as means for economic integration. Yet, in recent years, the 
human rights dimension of equality has gained momentum as a justification and legitimization 
narrative.95 According to Prechal, judge at the CJEU, “[t]he process of transformation is firmly coupled 
to the shift in the rationales underlying equality and non-discrimination: from economic integration 
motives to more socially oriented concerns to the protection of human dignity, autonomy and 
                                                 
91 See Sylvia Walby, Jo Armstrong and Sofia Strid, 'Intersectionality and the Quality of the Gender Equality Architecture' 
(2012) 19 Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 446 
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personality”.96 This reflects well the tension between imports from international human rights discourses, 
emphasising a form of per se validity of equality protection on the one hand; and utilitarian norms of 
market-based non-discrimination as long found in EU law. The demands of these two rationales seem 
irreconcilable. In fact, the promotion of a general principle of non-discrimination seen as a fundamental 
right corresponds to an imperative understanding of equality. It exists in tension with the historical 
instrumental mandate of non-discrimination as a facilitator for economic integration. This tension is 
observable in the jurisprudence of the CJEU. The Court has at times identified a general principle of 
non-discrimination as a fundamental right, emanating from inter alia the Charter, which imposes itself 
on market relationships, while on the contrary sticking to the text of the directives at other times, with 
no direct horizontal effect.97 This mixture of legal norms, origins and rationales puts the CJEU in a 
difficult position, thus opening the door for criticisms regarding the Court trespassing its domain of 
competence. This section investigates how the evolution of the normative and moral foundations of EU 
equality law underlies the transformative turn described in the first section. A reflection about the 
foundational narratives of recent EU non-discrimination law also sheds light on the apparent 
contradictions of its evolution. 
A hybrid model: between market-oriented and human-rights-driven understandings of equality 
The tension between an imperative and an instrumental vision of equality 
The EU non-discrimination law and jurisprudence is not born as a genuine effort to protect a 
fundamental right of equality. The roots of EU non-discrimination law are to be found in the efforts to 
realise a single market without competition distortions, that is to integrate national markets and to ensure 
the freedom of circulation of workers. For this reason, at its origins the prohibition to discriminate 
logically concerned two core characteristics which were held responsible for causing distortions of 
competition among EU workers, namely nationality and sex. 98  Hence, non-discrimination rights 
primarily served the purpose of boosting economic participation, and thus growth. France is responsible 
for pushing for equal pay between men and women, seen as conditio sine qua non to avoid unfair 
competition, thus instilling gender equality in the European integration process.99 With the reforms of 
the 2000s, however, an alternative rationale has emerged, related to a vision of equality as a human right 
and to the search for a fundamental set of values for the Union. This competition between a market- and 
a rights-based narrative of non-discrimination plays out at two levels. First, a difference between ‘market’ 
and ‘beyond market’ rationales can be drawn in terms of origins and justification of equality protection. 
While the “old” grounds – gender and nationality – arose from market-related concerns, the new grounds 
have mainly been supported by human-rights driven justifications, except for age which is the product 
of hybrid concerns. Second, the opposition plays out in the differences between material scope of the 
various directives. the directives protecting certain grounds from discrimination are associated to 
different material scopes. Some are protected only within the realm of the market (employment, 
consumption, etc.), and some are more largely protected (i.e. race and gender, for instance in the media, 
education, etc.). However, some fundamental criticisms pertain to the market emphasis to the 
disadvantage of a fundamental right to equality. A pessimistic way to frame the mandate of EU equality 
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law is as a protection of an EU “transnational substantive economic due process”.100 This critique tends 
to stress the fact that discrimination law in the EU still serves the purpose of facilitating fair competition 
by avoiding unjustified distortions, barriers to market entry and participation, and this in a system where 
different national social models are confronted at the transnational level. However, both understandings 
of equality with their different focal points are needed in a perspective of substantive equality.101 
Economic as well as recognition-based aspects are complementary.102 Hence some confusion arises out 
of this rhetorical opposition between a ‘market’ and a ‘beyond market’ logic of equality. The next 
sections explain how both narratives of equality played out in the transformation of EU non-
discrimination landscape until today. 
From market integration to equality as a fundamental right: a shifting legitimising narrative 
While the historic origins of EU non-discrimination law are well-known, its newer underlying rationale 
has counted a lot towards the recent evolution of EU non-discrimination law, and therefore deserves 
attention. The latest reforms in non-discrimination law in the EU have been greatly influenced by the 
discourses and emphasis on the EU as a promoter of rights. After decades of putting aside the human 
rights project in order to privilege economic integration, the Union’s human rights era manifested itself 
in two ways: externally through international security and peacebuilding missions, and internally by 
putting forward a new rationale for equality protection. It progressively started after the Maastricht 
Treaty, with a preliminary liberation from market logics through the creation of a European citizenship, 
granting rights to European citizens beyond the labour market.103 Yet, the year 2000 marks the real 
beginning of the fundamental rights era for the EU, with the adoption of the Charter. The Lisbon Treaty 
was a new turn for fundamental rights. In 2009 the Charter became binding, and the EU acceded to the 
UNCRPD. Moreover, until 2013 discussions took place about EU’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The background behind this is the rise of racism and xenophobia in the 
EU since the 1980s. After the populist and far-right politician Haider scored high at the Austrian general 
elections in 1999, the EU feared violations of human rights and started to introduce safeguards. This has 
triggered a reaction from all EU governments. Other concerns like the ageing of the population also 
explain the readiness to reform non-discrimination law, as well as the growing international attention 
for the rights of people living with disabilities. The rise of the combined social justice and human rights 
discourse in fact relates to a context of pressure in favour of the protection of human rights at the 
international level. At the time, we observe a multiplication of the conventions protecting several 
vulnerable categories (e.g. UN CEDAW, CERD, CRPD, CRC, etc.). In addition, another important 
factor of influence is that a majority of centre-left government representatives were sitting at the Council 
of Ministers at the time of the discussion of the new directives. The two 2000 directives were approved 
quickly, suggesting that EUMS governments felt the need to affirm and stress human rights at a time 
where they appeared threatened by the rise of right-wing extremisms.104  All of this adds up to a 
pathological lack of legitimacy of the EU integration process at the time, which made the fight against 
discrimination a perfect opportunity for the EU to show unity and to push forward a form of de minimis 
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European citizenship through non-discrimination law. All these conditions hence created a favourable 
terrain for EU institutional actors to take action. 
In addition to these historical developments, at the institutional level the human rights framing mobilised 
various equality activists. The directives were strongly supported by the European Parliament and the 
European Commission, but also the product of the mobilisation of civil society actors. For instance, 
several groups concerned with social exclusion were engaged in active lobbying in Brussels: The Social 
Platform, Solidar, the Youth Forum, the European Federation for Intercultural Learning, the European 
Human Rights Foundation and diverse religious organisations.105 These groups focused on various 
issues such as ageism and disability, but the anti-racist lobby was the most successful. The Starting Line, 
the Migrants’ Forum, the Anti-Poverty Lobby, the Women’s Lobby are examples of active partners in 
the dialogue with EU institutions. As early as 1993, the Starting Line Group proposed a draft directive, 
which later gave birth to Directive 2000/43/EC. The European Commission welcomed the civil society 
participation.106 The institutionalisation of new non-discrimination rights is in fact due to the match 
between two concerns: the globalisation of the human rights discourse on the one hand, put forward by 
transnational NGOs credited with legitimacy in their field; and the quest for legitimacy and exploitation 
of socio-political windows of opportunity by the EU institutions to serve the purpose of reviving EU 
integration through consensual action. Finally, the convergence between the EU and the human rights 
regime reflects a “dialectical tension manifest in the complex interaction between ‘mobilizing’ actors 
seeking to strengthen the institutions for human rights protection—including civil society actors, 
transnational networks, and supranational actors like the European Commission and the Court of 
Justice—and ‘resistant’ governmental actors seeking to curb and deter the same”.107  
As a result, within the Union’s borders the most prominent area of human rights activity is the EU 
regime of antidiscrimination law, notably since the adoption of Article 13 (now Article 18 TFEU) with 
the Amsterdam Treaty.108 Beyond the constitutional changes operated with the Charter and the Lisbon 
Treaty, further reforms include the creation of a Fundamental Rights Agency replacing the Vienna 
monitoring centre against racism and xenophobia, and the creation of a network of experts on 
fundamental rights. 109 However, although the 2000s were a crucial time for legislative progress in the 
protection from discrimination, some failures have also been observed. Digging deeper into the 
negotiation process of the directives, it appears that the Race Equality Directive originally arose from 
an effort of civil society organisations to ban race and religious discrimination and exclusion in Europe. 
This interfaith dialogue led to the proposal made by the Starting Line Group, which framed race and 
religious discrimination as a single issue, in which the two grounds are highly overlapping.110 However, 
when the draft was examined by the Parliament and the Commission, race was accepted as the unique 
ground for protection, whereas religion was later covered by Directive 2000/78/EC, with a much 
narrower scope. The motion towards equalising the levels of protection across grounds through the so-
called Horizontal Equality Directive (the Proposal) was rejected in 2008. 
While the ‘fundamental rights’ rationale stands until today as one of the main foundations of the 
European equality law project, both as a strong legitimising narrative and a legal basis to grant rights to 
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individuals, even in their private interactions. This reflects the rhetorical enterprise of the CJEU to 
enforce a human rights perspective on non-discrimination,111 coupled to a rhetoric of social justice. The 
language of the now failed 2008 Proposal provides a good example as it reveals an element of the 
‘Renewed Social Agenda: Opportunities, access and solidarity in 21st century Europe’ 112  i.e. the 
centrality of topics of social inclusion and solidarity as the bigger aims of EU anti-discrimination policy. 
Presenting itself as a social justice actor and a human rights defender, strengthening equality protection 
has allowed the EU to access low cost legitimacy and to keep up with international standards through a 
facially less market-focussed logic thanks to the great purchasing power of the human rights discourse. 
True at the rhetorical foundational level, it nevertheless remains limited in practice by the scope of 
competences of EU law, which primarily concerns market-related issues. 
In this context, the general principle of non-discrimination advocated by the CJEU brings equality 
protection closer to the standard of a fundamental right, which is associated with a higher level of 
protection in a wider range of situations, and for a wider range of persons than guaranteed by EU law 
stricto sensu. The proclamation of the general principle of non-discrimination has thus taken EU non-
discrimination law beyond its economic origins.113 Prechal speaks for instance of “a timid move from 
the narrow area of non-discrimination in the workplace towards issues like reconciliation of work and 
family life”.114 This view has been confirmed by the case law and is supported by the observation that 
the CJEU and the ECtHR are in a loose dialogue with each other. However, the extent to which the 
CJEU has the competence to enforce the general principle of non-discrimination as a fundamental right 
is limited and not yet clear. There is an apparent tension between the universality claim born by non-
discrimination principles linked to the human rights discourse, and the limitations of the scope of EU 
law to the market area for most protected grounds. Hence, the focus remains strongly on market issues, 
mostly related to labour issues, notably after substantial backlash and worries regarding the respect of 
the subsidiarity principle. 
The hybrid EU non-discrimination model: a difficult balancing of clashing social interests 
Human rights concerns and economic integration goals constitute at the same time two competing 
legitimising narratives and frames of interpretation for the evolution of EU antidiscrimination law. 
However, today’s non-discrimination rights are a construction that rely on both foundations. They relate 
to both the efforts to transform everyday relationships by remodelling them according to a concept of 
substantive equality, and at the same time to the goal of serving as de minimis safeguards in the absence 
of a social policy to enforce distributive equality at an EU-wide level. Reich argues for instance that, 
within the evolution towards fundamental rights, a social dimension developed over time, 
complementing the market oriented approach of EU non-discrimination law.115 That is, Article 21 and 
23 of the Charter guaranteed equality as a fundamental right, the protection of which extends beyond 
the limited scope of employment. At the same time, the scope of EU law is limited. What space does 
this leave for the protection of equality beyond the market? How do both considerations play out in non-
discrimination law? 
First of all, non-discrimination law is a site of balancing between two clashing social interests: on the 
one hand, setting societal safeguards in form of non-discrimination rights is part of guaranteeing a 
fundamental right to equality, and on the other hand, private autonomy of market actors is a funding 
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element of liberal capitalist societies. The simultaneity of a vertical and a horizontal dimension of non-
discrimination rights valid between private actors creates an “inevitable clash” 116  with economic 
efficiency concerns and the principle of party autonomy, freedom of contract and the right to 
differentiate. While this clash allows to boost non-discrimination to a new level, this bipolarity of EU 
non-discrimination law makes the equality set of the EU, considered as a whole, resemble a 
“patchwork”.117 In fact, the balancing between the two concerns differs across grounds and contexts, 
with different levels of protection, different scopes of application, and different levels of scrutiny at the 
CJEU.  
Second, besides being criticised for its incoherence, the hybrid nature of EU equality law has been 
pointed at for its normative deficiency.118 Non-discrimination rights are negatively constructed. They 
are meant to be enforced at the individual level by corrective mechanisms, in a time of economic crisis 
where the maintenance of equality through comprehensive collective redistribution by a welfare state at 
the European level is inexistent. EU antidiscrimination law is therefore criticised for being a means to 
avoid costlier ‘hard’ measures, such as ‘hard-core’ social policies to be granted to entire groups 
positively and upstream.119 Somek for instance claims that non-discrimination law “disguise[s] the 
Union’s lack of ability to address social concerns”.120 Thus, he puts forward that antidiscrimination law 
in the EU often serves as an argument to justify neoliberal policies and serves as an ersatz for the 
unwillingness to create a European super-welfare state. Hence human rights would be a vitrine while 
non-discrimination law would only have the function to smoothen the interactions of different national 
welfare and economic systems that must cooperate within the realm of the EU. This, according to him, 
is meant to avoid EU member states suffering economic disadvantage in these transnational 
interactions.121 However, this negative model of non-discrimination rights has started to change with the 
shift operated towards less exclusively court-centric equality enforcement, to the advantage of a more 
bottom-up approach within the member states. Therefore, rather than of ersatz, one could rather speak 
of de minimis guarantees of protection at the national level, framed by a discursive strategy depicting 
equality as a global human right, but in practice limited by the market-based scope of EU competences. 
While EU integration was running out of steam upon the completion of market integration, the focus on 
rights, notably through non-discrimination law-making, allowed the EU to regain legitimacy in its 
efforts towards deeper integration. The EU Commission took active steps to enhance EU 
antidiscrimination law to reactivate the integration process by promoting human rights as one of the core 
missions of the Union, and to present the EU as a protector of a pluralist society where identity claims 
and diversity accommodation take a more and more important place. Hence, this renewed insistence on 
rights and protection is both an instrument of self-legitimation and part of an effort to redefine the 
European model of justice in a time of crisis and austerity, within the area of competences granted to 
the Union.  
Thus, although criticized, this hybrid model has permitted to set up common safeguards at the national 
levels, independently of the member states’ choices in terms of social model. The consequence of this 
is the evolution of non-discrimination law towards diversification of equality rights, which range from 
economic and social to identity-related rights. This diversification relates to what Kennedy calls the 
“third globalization”, where a discourse about identity/rights and the management of diversity through 
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human rights and non-discrimination law has succeeded to an era of the “Social”.122 Kennedy argues 
that a global discourse of human rights and identity rights has emerged within legal systems that are 
bound to be pluralistic through “recognizing and managing difference” and diversity. 123  EU non-
discrimination law reflects this trend through convergence with internationally promoted values and an 
increased protection of vulnerable identities or group memberships. Consequently, the EU model is 
complex and comprehends both individual liberal rights, where anti-discrimination is conceived as the 
equal opportunity to access the market, as well as a kind of group-based multiculturalist understanding 
of equality, centred on positive rights (e.g. the accommodation of diversity). The new orientation of this 
hybrid model is however unclear, thus casting doubts on the future of substantive equality in the EU. 
Yet, despite its incompleteness and apparent incoherence, the hybridity of the EU non-discrimination 
model can at the same time be seen as compromise between the protection of equality and of autonomy, 
combining recognition and distribution by focusing on the encompassing access to market participation 
as a pre-condition for citizenship in the Union. 
Non-discrimination as a site of reconciliation: equal citizenship through market participation 
In this perspective, instead of opposing the economic and the rights-based understandings of equality, 
both can be brought together within the logic of substantive equality and the transformative endeavour 
of the EU. In order to reconcile the tension between the extension of EU non-discrimination law towards 
the protection of diversity, identity and human rights as a general principle on the one hand, and on the 
other the predominantly economic bound of non-discrimination rights, it is useful to think about the 
diverse dimensions of equality. In fact, both distribution and recognition are two fundamental aspects 
of equality. Both dimensions are key to social participation, and thus citizenship. If we accept Fredman’s 
definition of equality as full participation, equality encompasses four dimensions: political participation, 
economic participation and the redress of disadvantage, identity recognition and accommodation of 
diversity, and finally the end of violence and stigma.124 The recent change of rationale in EU non-
discrimination law seems to have extended the scope of protection from the second dimension 
(economic) to the third (identity recognition and accommodation), and even to some extent the fourth, 
within the limit of the scope of EU law.125 Hence, the hybrid transformation of EU equality law as both 
a safeguard for economic participation (labour, consumption) and an expression of the fundamental right 
to equality can be understood as a project to give vulnerable EU citizens the possibility to fully 
participate within EU society. 
Equality through the market: granting participation of socially marginalised groups through distribution 
An optimistic understanding of the evolution of EU non-discrimination law is to consider the market 
focus as a condition for equality. Therefore, one can speak about distribution as a form of equality 
happening in the framework of the market, by opposition to redistribution, which, despite also being a 
social equaliser, is a form of post-market equality promotion. In fact, the market is one of the main 
sources of social interactions in life, through labour and consumption. It is also an area over which the 
EU has regulatory powers, as opposed to other areas like family law where European non-discrimination 
laws have no grasp. By way of illustration, the Lisbon Strategy had at its heart this idea that 
antidiscrimination law should serve to boost competitiveness and to reconcile solidarity and economic 
efficiency. Antidiscrimination law as a corrective to unbalanced social and market opportunities is based 
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on the assumption that virtually all human interactions are market interactions, and that inequalities can 
be remedied on an individual basis.126 This is why, according to this liberal understanding, “[i]t is 
difficult to imagine a principle that would be better suited to reconciling solidarity and competitiveness 
than the principle of equality of opportunity”.127 Access to the market ensures economic, and therefore 
a form of social, participation through labour and the access to goods and services. Hence, it constitutes 
a precondition for full participation in society, which is a core dimension of equality. Münch describes 
this process as the “premarket activation” of each individual and “the guarantee of equal opportunity” 
instead of “postmarket redistribution with the aim of approaching an equality of results”.128 This means 
abolishing discrimination as an obstacle to the limitation of the participation of these minorities in the 
EU (economic) project. This form of “access justice” 129  seems to reconcile the tension between 
imperative and instrumental framings of equality, by conceiving of antidiscrimination law as an 
equaliser in private relations and thus in social participation. Non-discrimination and equality rights in 
fact serve to protect “weaker parties”130 or citizens made vulnerable by their membership in socially 
disadvantaged groups, that must be protected and accommodated.131 According to Micklitz, EU non-
discrimination rules provide workers and consumers with the bundle of rights necessary for them to be 
able to participate in and to gain from the EU economy.132 Equality of opportunities in “reaping off the 
benefits of the market”133 is a pre-condition for exercising freedom and citizenship in the EU. Of course, 
this is a liberal and economically driven understanding of equality, just like the Union itself. In this 
perspective, protecting EU citizens horizontally from discrimination mainly means granting them access 
to publicly and privately provided goods and services (as diverse as housing, health, etc.), and the labour 
market. This anchor in the market stems from the very range of competences of the EU. If the 
transformative bite of non-discrimination law mainly affects employment and consumption, rather than 
for instance marriage law,134 it is indeed because of the nature and powers of the EU.  
However, this form of “access justice”135 cannot be equated with a redistributive dimension of equality. 
At most, it is a bridging principle at the EU level that calls for complementary social redistributive 
measures at the national level, the determinacy of which is left in the hands of national governments. In 
fact, beyond market rights, only a few other domains are regulated by non-discrimination law, but the 
unbalance in favour of market related areas is important. Still, in light of the prevalently economic 
competences of the EU, these guarantees constitute crucial minimum standards. As a consequence, even 
though seen in opposition, the rights narrative and the market narratives are not contradictory. They both 
contribute to the transformative function of EU non-discrimination law, through an attempt to grant 
substantive participation opportunities to all citizens, by protecting the ones society’s power structures 
make vulnerable, but with a focus on market access, domain of competence of the EU. This can be 
equated with a logic of equality of opportunities. Therefore, it can be for being unable to ensure a form 
of equality of results, which would require redistributive elements. Yet, some complementary efforts 
such as affirmative action and accommodation push forward a less formal and a more substantive vision 
of equality. In this, the protection of the access to the market is nevertheless limited to some 
characteristics which correspond to ascriptive identity traits, and leaves out social or family status, 
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income, etc. An open question regards whether the Union is willing to go so far in its access justice logic 
as to use the Charter as a touchstone for non-discrimination and equality,136 which would basically 
correspond to the full enforcement of a general equality principle across a broader range of categories.137 
Looking at the current unevenness of equal protection casts doubts on this perspective and supports 
more the differentiated protection hypothesis. However, here one of the key dimensions of equality 
clearly appears: recognition. 
Equality before the market: recognising identity, accommodating diversity 
Looking at the EU non-discrimination system from the point of view of participation reveals another 
dimension. Granting market access to vulnerable groups or individuals also comprehends a dimension 
linked to identity recognition of marginalised or vulnerable groups. Münch argues that the removal of 
market barriers only helps the active and leaves the inactive even more marginalised, so that targeted 
policies are designed to support them and grant them access to the market.138 According to him, market 
integration is now completed because barriers of (economic) discrimination have been removed so that 
the market-driven dimensions of non-discrimination law are now overridden by concerns over inclusion 
and recognition.139 As he puts it, “the collectively shared identity of minorities was left as the last reason 
for discrimination”.140 Therefore, the other dimension of participation is recognition. In fact, EU non-
discrimination law and policy places much weight on the recognition of discriminated identity traits and 
the accommodation of diversity. As constitutional liberalism has created equal opportunities for the 
members of the dominant culture, demands for recognition of other cultural identities is rising. Therefore 
the question of the replacement of constitutional liberalism by constitutional multiculturalism arises, 
which would also protect “the cultural identities of groups” in addition to the “individuals’ rights to 
freedom”.141 It reinforces the position of all – and therefore of (some of the) disadvantaged – EU citizens 
as workers and consumers through a strengthening of their individual rights but also as groups sharing 
the same identity characteristics.  
All in all, even if at first there seems to exist a liberation move of non-discrimination law from the 
economic logic, recognition and distribution are intrinsically connected. Recognition is actually 
rendered possible through targeted measured aimed at improving economic opportunities of some 
particular groups. Therefore, while the rights-driven and the economic-driven projects seem in 
contradiction at the rhetorical level in the task of legitimising narrative for EU non-discrimination law; 
looking at the application of EU non-discrimination law makes clear that both logics work in sync. In 
the absence of a proper redistributive dimension in the EU social project, non-discrimination rights serve 
the protection and the recognition of diverse identities through guaranteeing their participation in EU 
citizenship, which is primarily constituted by market participation, the four basic freedoms and their 
derivations. The logic behind EU non-discrimination law is a liberal polity that solves social conflicts 
by promoting economic growth, individual freedom and individual access to markets. Yet, in the very 
selection of identities to protect, recognition generates a collective dimension within a very individual 
equality model.  
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However, the argument that granting market access to these minorities has become the centre of the 
non-discrimination law because no other form of inclusion is recognised can be challenged. Some 
elements in the present directives, as well as in the project for their horizontal extension, show that the 
fight against discrimination goes beyond the sole, albeit central, access to the market. Reich argues that 
promoting EU citizenship through anti-discrimination law departs from an individualistic concept of 
equality and evolves towards an understanding of its collective dimension.142 Yet this is minimalistic 
and does not correspond to the definition of group justice as focusing on redistribution and “redress[ing] 
past subordination and discrimination”.143 For instance, the recent prohibition of indirect discrimination 
relates more to the collective nature of discrimination than direct discrimination, which is more centred 
on individuals. For a long time, the discussion on the collective effects of discrimination has largely 
been undermined by an omnipresent individualistic focus, explainable because of the predominant 
enforcement structure through individual claims in front of the CJEU. This has started to change with 
the missions given to the equality bodies. The administrative turn, more centred on policy 
recommendations, awareness-rising work and enforcement tries to address this bias by diffusing equality 
at all levels in the EU member states. This is all the more noticeable that often the mandates of equality 
bodies go beyond the minimum standards guaranteed by the EU. The promotion of social inclusion 
therefore goes beyond a liberal individualistic conception of justice and is also associated with group-
oriented justice,144 in dialogue with social groups themselves. The EU Commission in fact stands in 
continuous exchange with civil society and advocacy groups, as well as with researchers and the 
academia in order to advance equality protection. Beyond the market access and rudimentary 
“welfarist” 145  dimensions, EU non-discrimination law also includes aspects linked to genuine 
recognition. Identity recognition politics in the form of non-discrimination laws can however be 
criticised for complying with the neoliberal requirements of limiting the use of redistributive justice as 
a remedy against inequality146. In fact, the EU has only the power to guarantee the access to the market 
to ‘vulnerable’ categories, not participation itself. 
Equality beyond the market: non-discrimination through citizenship  
Some elements in the recognition of the groups protected by non-discrimination law and the nature of 
this protection go beyond market concerns and touch upon other important dimension of substantive 
equality. Elements of protection linked to dignity or dimensions of social participation and inclusion 
other than economic, such as education and social protection, are in fact not subsumable in the category 
of market access rights, even though the latter stay at the centre of EU non-discrimination law. Prechal 
herself notices “a shift away from the economic integration motives towards the recognition of equality 
and non-discrimination as a self-standing fundamental right”.147 Other commentators spoke, as early as 
2002, of a new guiding rationale in EU non-discrimination law, with concepts like “fairness, autonomy, 
human dignity and respect for human rights” as well as “the creation of a better society” as leitmotivs.148 
Looking at EU non-discrimination law from the point of view of citizenship explains both the market 
access and the dignity-based or recognition-based rights as necessary and complementary dimensions 
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of equality. Full participation in society is a key condition of equal citizenship. Protecting equal 
citizenship through non-discrimination law is a way to further integration, in which the EU performs 
two tasks. On the one hand, it protects citizens from institutional discrimination at the level of member 
states. On the other hand, it constructs a more equal transnational society where all member states must 
enforce minimum standards and where the EU is the last guardian of these minimum equality norms.149 
By transforming EU citizenship and integrating the levelling dimension of equality, the EU seeks to 
change citizens’ interrelationships in several key areas of social life, but within the limits of the scope 
of EU law. This does not only concern market participation and its direct consequences in terms of social 
relations, but also – although for certain grounds only – education, social benefits, health, the media, 
etc. 150  This transformative understanding goes further than what an equal access to the market. 
According to Reich, the anti-discrimination principle protects the “autonomy of persons as EU citizens 
to enjoy a bundle of rights, in particular the right to free movement in a broader sense”.151 Therefore, 
equality is a core dimension of EU citizenship, in all areas where the EU can potentially intervene. In 
this perspective, the protection from racial discrimination goes the furthest, even blurring the frontier of 
EU competences to a certain extent, which might be a cause for the lack of extension of such an extensive 
protection from discrimination to other grounds. 
Thus, non-discrimination is now one of the constituting principles of private law in EU law, “creeping 
into European contract law”, and even has the potential to expand its scope of application beyond areas 
and grounds so far recognised.152 
However, until today equality in the EU is mainly realised through the equal access to the labour, goods 
and services markets. While a model of access justice is prevalent, a more comprehensive version of 
equality oriented towards a collective justice beyond market also exists. A major problem is that it is 
currently limited to the grounds of gender and race. The proposal to extend this comprehensive 
protection to the other protected grounds has failed, thus creating a long-term hierarchy between the 
grounds protected, with different standards, material scopes and approaches. This differentiated 
protection is at odds with the rising general principle of equal treatment proclaimed by the Court and 
backed by the institutional language of a fundamental right to equality. 
Hierarchies in EU non-discrimination law: a differentiated equality protection 
Since its origins, EU non-discrimination law is characterised by a differentiated equality protection. 
Anti-discriminatory provisions on grounds of nationality and sex were introduced first. They remained 
the only protected vectors of discrimination for more than 40 years. With the introduction of a multiple 
grounds approach in 2000, one would have expected the protection to extend uniformly across all 
legislated grounds. However, the EU non-discrimination system is fractured by several lines of hierarchy. 
The argument of this section is that a double de jure and de facto hierarchy limits the potential and reach 
of the newly promoted general principle of non-discrimination, both as market access and as a 
fundamental right. This double hierarchy poses limits to the transformative reach of the general principle 
of non-discrimination in the EU. Besides, the fact that it results from contingent individual reforms 
instead of a systemic politically reflected and socially conscious choice poses problems in terms of 
values and prioritisation of protection. 
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De jure hierarchy 
The first place in which hierarchy fractures the EU non-discrimination system is the legislative setting. 
A de jure hierarchy has been established by the three new directives 2000/43/EC, 2000/78/EC and 
2004/113/EC. This is true at three levels: the scope, the exceptions and the effectiveness of secondary 
legislation.  
Scope of protection 
First, the scope of protection of each ground is different. Racial and ethnic discrimination is prohibited 
in several areas: in the field of employment, including self-employment, occupation and vocational 
training; in the field of education; in the field of social protection (social security and health care) and 
social advantages; and in the field of access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, 
including housing. These prohibitions are guaranteed by Directive 2000/43/EC, which features the 
broadest scope of protection among all protected grounds of discrimination. Gender discrimination has 
historically been prohibited in the field of employment, where EU non-discrimination law has its roots. 
Indeed, secondary rules guarantee equal pay since 1975 with the first Equal Pay Directive153 and equal 
treatment since 1976 with the so-called second Equal Treatment Directive.154 The principle of equal 
treatment between men and women was furthered and completed by directives in the fields of statutory 
social security, 155  occupational social security schemes, self-employment, pregnant workers and 
parental leave from the 1970s to the 1990s. Many of these provisions have been clarified, modernised 
and harmonised by Recast Directive 2006/54.156 In between, a major extension of gender equality 
protection took place in 2000 with the enactment of Directive 2004/113/EC prohibiting discrimination 
in the access to and supply of goods and services.157 In addition, EU law proclaims the principle of 
gender mainstreaming, which means that gender issues must be put at the centre of every policy, 
independently of which are of law/policy is concerned. As a result, race and gender equality are very 
broadly protected, notably in two major life areas, that is employment and consumption. However, we 
already notice the existence of a de jure hierarchy between the protection against racial and sex-based 
discrimination. While the Race Equality Directive includes education in its scope, gender equality 
protection explicitly leaves education out, as well as the media and advertising.158 All the other grounds 
protected are the product of the guarantees laid out in Directive 2000/78/EC. The so-called Framework 
Equality Directive protects religion or belief, sexual orientation, age and disability in the area of 
employment, including vocational training, self-employment, education, and covering working 
conditions (pay, dismissals, promotion). The protection explicitly excludes state-based social protection, 
including social security.159 It also excludes education as well as the field of consumption of goods and 
services. This makes the level of protection of the four latter grounds the most reductive across the entire 
EU non-discrimination field.  
The EU non-discrimination secondary law: a hierarchy based on scopes of protection160 
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For what concerns the material scope, only gender, and to a certain extent race, are protected beyond 
the market (e.g. in social protection and health care for race and gender and in education for race only). 
Within the market, they are also protected to a larger extent than the other grounds (consumption of 
goods and services instead of employment contexts only). This means that race and gender are protected 
horizontally, that is not only in public-private relationships involving the State, but also in relations 
between private actors within the public domain (commercial or professional activities), not only in the 
employment context, but also beyond, contrarily to other grounds. The proposal made by the European 
Commission in 2008 to extend the material scope of protection of the other grounds outside the labour 
market to the consumption market, education and social protection was a failure.161 In parallel, the 
Commission planned to amend Directive 2000/43/EC by extending positive action, reasonable 
accommodation and remedial provisions in the field of racial discrimination. This attempt failed as well. 
One more piece of evidence of this hierarchical ordering is that the creation of equality bodies is only 
an obligation in the fields of gender and race equality, not for the other grounds protected by the 
Framework Equality Directive. The requirement that these organisations support applicants and act on 
their behalf in judicial proceedings162 therefore only compulsorily applies to race and gender, thus 
extending the hierarchy to enforcement. Finally, the fact that secondary legislation only protects some 
of the characteristics protected by Article 21 of the Charter also indicates a hierarchy. While the Charter 
additionally protects language, social origin, genetic features, birth, property, political and other opinion 
and national minorities, the most recent non-discrimination directives remain silent in this regard. 
Legislative exceptions 
The second place in which a hierarchy is distinguishable is the list of exceptions provided for each 
ground in the directives. Apart from the general exception of genuine occupational requirement which, 
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in very rare instances, authorises differential treatment based on a protected ground, discrimination 
based on certain grounds is more easily justifiable than on others. Indeed, the Framework Equality 
Directive foresees in its recital 19 that the non-discrimination provisions may not apply to the armed 
force for the grounds of disability and age. Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78/EC provides for exceptions 
for religious institutions, which can impose certain conditions on their employees, mainly on the basis 
of their sex.163 Further, Recital 25 and Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC provide for specific derogations 
linked to age when differential treatment is justified, thus lowering the level of protection against age 
discrimination in comparison to other grounds.164 In Article 6, the exceptions to the prohibition of age 
discrimination take the form of objective and reasonable ‘justifications’ of differential treatment, which 
must serve a legitimate aim. However, the provision is wide and the high number of possible 
justifications has yielded many referrals to the CJEU, in fact the highest among all grounds. Usually 
justifications only apply to indirect discrimination and not to cases of direct discrimination, but in the 
case of the justifications of differential treatment based on age, the directive does not specify. Hence, 
direct as well as indirect discrimination can be justified by the list of exceptions provided in Article 6 of 
Directive 2000/78/EC. The CJEU is therefore left with important discretion in its interpretation of the 
justifications, and its case law has shown a wide margin of application let to the member states .165 
Besides, the protection of national origin is restricted by Directive 2000/43/EC so as to respect member 
states’ power to control immigration at their borders. However, some concerns have been expressed that 
this exception might deal as a limitation of the protection from racial discrimination for third-country 
nationals. 166  The sum of these different exceptions contributes to the fragmentation of the non-
discrimination protection. By providing certain derogations or justifications based on certain grounds 
but not others, it reinforces the existence of a de jure hierarchy. 
Effectiveness 
The third place in which hierarchy operates is the effectiveness167 of the non-discrimination legislation, 
which is related both to the source of law and to the judicial interpretation of the relevant provisions. 
Originally, the prohibition of sex discrimination has been anchored in the Treaty (Article 119 EC 
regarding equal pay, now Article 157 TFEU). In Defrenne II, the Court confirmed that the Treaty anchor 
gave horizontal direct effect to the principle of sex equality in the context of employment. The 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality also benefitted from a limited horizontal direct 
effect under certain circumstances.168 This is explained by the existence of a general principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of nationality, linked to Article 18 TFEU. In fact, in Marshall169 the CJEU 
made clear that there is no horizontal direct effect ensuing from directives. Recently, the Court revived 
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the debate by deriving a horizontal direct effect from the general principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age underpinning Directive 2000/78/EC. This first happened in Mangold, where the CJEU 
gave validity to the general principle even though the transposition time of the directive had not yet 
passed. Precisely because of the finding of this general principle, the CJEU could later confirm its 
horizontal direct effect in Kücükdeveci, and more recently in Dansk Industri.170 The novelty is that the 
general principle at stake generates horizontal direct effect without being a written source of EU law,171 
as previously the case for sex and nationality with Treaty provisions, but rather a finding of the Court 
itself through its case law. Given its level of abstraction, this is an important innovation for the principle 
of effectiveness in EU non-discrimination law.172 As a result, questions arise regarding the material 
scope of the new general principle of non-discrimination and its extension to other grounds also 
protected by Directive 2000/78/EC, as well as its effectiveness. By posing the hypothesis that this 
general principle could be developed given the high amount of age discrimination litigation in front of 
the Court, one can wonder whether the same approach will be extended to other grounds when 
opportunities to do so increase through a higher amount of litigation on the new grounds. The case of 
Römer, where the CJEU invoked the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, seems to indicate so, as the Court implied that the principle would cover all grounds 
protected by Directive 2000/78/EC. 173  Since the apparition of the general principle of non-
discrimination, the question of the link between the EU human rights order, the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights but more largely the European Convention on Human Rights, and the EU non-
discrimination regime is more vivid than ever before. The question of equality as a Treaty provision and 
as a human right contained in the Charter, which as constitutional status since 2009, seems to develop 
an existence beyond the EU statutory non-discrimination apparatus. In fact, the “new and distinctive 
substantive discrimination architecture”174 identified by Kilpatrick might well be extended to the newly 
protected grounds, expanding the general principle of non-discrimination and its wide reach, posing the 
question of its material scope, effectiveness and limits. This would make the protection of the new 
grounds very different from the protection frameworks of gender and race, which have been developed 
separately and through different instruments. However, some common points exist, as gender and 
nationality (in a limited way) benefit from a horizontal direct effect, while the CJEU also recognised the 
existence of a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of race, arising from Article 21 of the 
Charter, in Belov.175 Nevertheless, until today the principle of effectiveness has mainly contributed to 
the creation of another line of hierarchy within the EU non-discrimination regime, with horizontal direct 
effect for the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age and for sexual orientation 
(although through a much timider approach), as well as for gender equality and in a more limited way 
for non-discrimination based on nationality. The prohibition of discrimination based on other grounds 
such as religion and disability do not (yet) benefit from the same horizontal direct effects. This might 
also be explainable by the still relatively low amount of litigation on these three grounds, as well as the 
timid development of the horizontal direct effects framework for sexual orientation. 
This de jure triple hierarchy arises from the existence of different material scopes for the different 
grounds protected, from the existence of more or less numerous exceptions according to the ground 
concerned, and from the different levels of effectiveness associated to the protected grounds according 
to their different legislative setting. This has given rise to an uneven protection, with a scale of grounds 
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which features race on top, gender second, age at the bottom, and religion, sexual orientation and 
disability in the third position. This de jure hierarchy is completed by a de facto hierarchy. 
De facto hierarchy 
Even though not inscribed in the law itself, this de facto hierarchy is discernible at several levels. In 
addition to upholding many of the legal justifications made possible by the various directives, the CJEU 
has also applied different levels of scrutiny to the diverse protected grounds, leading to differentiated 
equality guarantees. Finally, the amounts of litigation and referrals to the CJEU differ from ground to 
ground, thus influencing the development and the level of protection of the grounds concerned. 
Implementation of exceptions, justifications, remedies and levels of scrutiny by the CJEU 
The first site in which this de facto hierarchy expresses itself is the interpretation given by the Court in 
terms of scrutiny of, and justifications for, differential treatment. One way to explain the variations in 
the application of justifications and level of scrutiny is to look at the rationales underlying the protection 
of the grounds. This induces variations of judicial interpretations of the protection against discrimination. 
First, this de facto hierarchy expresses itself through the implementation by the CJEU of the exceptions 
and justifications contained in the directives. As a ‘newer’ and ‘special’ ground, age bears a qualitatively 
different load than other discrimination grounds (changing according to time and space, and to be 
experienced by everyone of us). At the same time, age seems to be a less controversial176 ground so that 
the CJEU finds it easier to contradict age-based national and private policies. This is why the Court 
applied a looser standard of scrutiny in the age discrimination cases, sometimes considering differential 
treatment as a proportionate measure serving legitimate aims.177 It follows that the Court has adopted a 
mixed approach to age discrimination, considering differential treatment on grounds of age as more 
acceptably justified because of its mutable nature and its strong economic bearing, but also as an easier 
basis for intervention in national policies compared to more controversial grounds such as religion or 
sexual orientation. 
The hierarchy of grounds is also visible when one observes the remedies granted to victims. For instance, 
direct gender-based and race-based direct discrimination do not bear any possible justification, while all 
other grounds can be justified by public order concerns. Some commentators argue that the difference 
in protection of the various grounds reflects differences in the meaning of equality, ranging from 
redistribution, to identity recognition and participation. More precisely, these variations in the legal 
provisions, material scope, specificities and remedies associated to each ground put in competition these 
different meanings of equality. In parallel to this, the recognition of identity diversity presents itself as 
already a form of equality guarantee, in the sense of a public acknowledgement of the existence and 
legitimacy of certain minorities.178 Finally, participation is perceived as equality so far as social dialogue 
and political participation give people equal opportunities to shape and exploit their own life chances.179 
This creates further tension and conflict in the implementation of the new directives, as there is no 
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possible one-size-fits-all model but different approaches, specific to each type of ground. Instead these 
grounds and their associated equality model often clash and a prioritisation needs to be made. The CJEU 
jurisprudence shows that the Court oscillates between all these considerations, putting emphasis on one 
or the other aspects, but often quite inconsistently. 
The third site in which one can distinguish a de facto hierarchy is the differences in scrutiny applied by 
the Court. “[B]alancing seemingly contradicting principles of autonomy and non-discrimination” is a 
relative task180 because the balancing exercise performed by the Court depends on the area of law and 
the ground concerned.181 This hierarchy broadly corresponds to the US logic of the so-called ‘suspect 
classifications’, even though jurisprudential differential treatment is not strictly coded as in the US, but 
only impacts the level of scrutiny, whereby not as consistently as in the US. Prechal holds for instance 
that “the different rationales [underlying non-discrimination legislation and the different protected 
grounds] not only influence the interpretation and application of the various concepts of equality and 
non- discrimination, [but] also influence their mutual relationship”.182 While the level of scrutiny applied 
is dependent on the predominant rationale underlying the legislative protection at stake, the CJEU also 
tends to read economic interests in light of the fundamental rights understanding of equality and vice 
versa. This complicates the reading of the scrutiny scale applied by the CJEU, and renders impossible 
to automatically infer from the rationale underlying the protection of the ground at stake the strictness 
of review that is going to be applied. First, rationales matter at two levels: the context, circumstances or 
area in which non-discrimination legislation is applied, and second the protected ground concerned. 
Regarding the context and circumstances, Prechal claims that a looser test is applied in social security 
or taxation compared to employment or pay discrimination, at least in the case of gender.183 In the case 
of variations according to protected grounds, some features can be distinguished. For instance, Prechal 
makes clear that the review standard for nationality cases is very strict. We can suppose that this is 
because of the historical nature of the protection, and because non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality stood as a sine qua non condition for the then under construction Single Market. For age 
cases, however, the level of scrutiny seems looser given all the justifications mentioned earlier, and the 
recent and special nature of the ground of age, both a mutable trait and associated with economic rather 
than fundamental rights considerations. 184  As regards grounds banned under a fundamental rights 
rationale, such as race and disability, the standard of scrutiny seems to have been stricter, with a balance 
struck in favour of fundamental rights rather than competing economic interests.185 This reflects the 
dominant discourse about fundamental equality rights at the international level. As a historical mixed 
ground, gender equality enjoys both the functional protection linked to its economic consequences for 
the Single Market, and the more recently acquired fundamental right status recognised at the 
international level. This might however not be the case for religion, despite its international protection 
as a prohibited ground for discrimination at the UN and Council of Europe level. In fact, in the absence 
of a strong consensus on the place of religion in society within the EU, and in a context of both rising 
islamophobia and politicisation of the religious question in European societies (especially as regards 
Islam), it is unlikely that the CJEU expresses strong views on religious freedom, especially in a country 
like France, where laïcité presented as a neutral attitude from the State vis a vis religion deals as a way 
to exclude Islam from the public sphere.186 Likewise, the decisions in Achbita and Bougnaoui rather 
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indicate restraint in a context of high political sensitivity, both having trait to sovereignty and cultural 
identity questions.187 All in all, the CJEU’s approach is difficult to neatly classify, as confirmed by 
Prechal, who states that “while there is a rule of thumb – strict scrutiny wherever one of the prohibited 
grounds is at stake – the [Court] is rather pragmatic in its approach and not very principled, sometimes 
contrary to its own declaration of equality, and non-discrimination being fundamental principles or 
rights”.188 
Volumes of references for preliminary ruling 
Although non-discrimination is one of the major issues on which the CJEU has rendered decisions in 
the past years, mostly in a favourable manner to applicants who claimed to have been discriminated 
against, having a look at the references for preliminary ruling brought to the Court since the 2000s 
regarding non-discrimination gives a good impression of the existence of hierarchies of referrals 
between the grounds protected. The amount of references largely varies for each of the different 
protected grounds. While high levels of references generally indicate a high level of litigation at the 
level of EU member states (all things considered) and thus is a good indicator of the importance of the 
issue, a lower level indicates a lower willingness or need (e.g. is the application of the law clear enough?) 
either on the side of national courts to bring the issue in front of the CJEU, or on the side of public 
interest lawyers or private parties to litigate cases on the issues concerned. 
 It is striking that the first references for religious discrimination have only been made in 2015 and 
amount to two cases only, while Directive 2000/78/EC protecting among others from religious 
discrimination has been passed in 2000 and transposed at the latest in 2003.189 In the same vein, the first 
references for racial discrimination deemed admissible by the Court have been made only in 2007 and 
then in 2011,190 while the transposition delay of Directive 2000/43/EC was 2003. In contrast, age 
discrimination has been the object of references for preliminary rulings from national courts much earlier, 
since 2004 already. At the same time, the number of references for age discrimination has surpassed all 
other grounds, amounting to 55 references brought to the Court by national courts over the period 2004-
2015 according to the last CURIA update.191 It is interesting to notice that a majority of decisions 
regarding age discrimination originate from references for preliminary ruling by German courts (50,9 %), 
and to a lesser extent, Austrian and Danish courts (respectively 14,5 % and 10,9 %). This is due mainly 
to the ageing structure of their labour market. Preliminary referrals on other grounds have been far less 
numerous, although some disability case law is developing progressively. This compares to 12 
references only for disability192 and 9 for sexual orientation193 which rank respectively second and third 
in the hierarchy of references. After age, disability and sexual orientation arrives race, with only 9 
references, 4 of which have been deemed inadmissible. Besides, when referred, the question asked to 
                                                 
187 The intersection of gender, race, culture and religion and the question of female autonomy and patriarchy are completely 
silenced. See (nr. 72 and 74). 
188 Prechal, 'Discrimination does not fall down from heaven': the context and evolution of non-discrimination in EU law, 11 
189 It is not surprising that these references arise from France and Belgium. Preliminary references based on religion: Achbita 
(nr. 72) and Bougnaoui (nr. 74); 
190 Preliminary references based on race: Feryn (nr. 49) in 2007 and then Nikolava (nr. 52) in 2014 recognised discrimination 
but before this Vajnai in 2004, Agafitei in 2010 and Belov in 2011 were deemed inadmissible and no discrimination was 
found in Wardyn in 2009. C-668/15 Jyske Finans A/S v Ligebehandlingsnævnet, acting on behalf of Ismar Huskic is pending 
since 2015. 
191 See the annex of this paper. There have been 51 references for preliminary ruling concerning the sole ground of age and 4 
references concerning multiple grounds, including age. This amounts to 55 references. 
192 So far I have identified 10 references including joined and pending cases on the sole basis of disability, and 2 references on 
the basis of multiple grounds, among which disability. See annex. 
193 So far I have identified 8 references including joined cases on the sole basis of sexual orientation, and 1 reference on the 
basis of multiple grounds, among which sexual orientation. See annex. 
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the CJEU as regards disability, sexual orientation and race were more basic than for age because subject 
to less exceptions.194 At the bottom of the hierarchy comes religion, with only two references and where 
the CJEU has found no directly discriminatory character in a rule prohibiting Islamic headscarf at work, 
and has accepted its potentially legitimate nature in case of indirect discrimination.195 It seems that the 
new developments brought by Directive 2004/113/EC to the historical protection of gender equality 
have also provoked little effusion at the national level, with only two decisions since its transposition 
deadline in 2007.196 
All in all, there is therefore a de facto hierarchy, linked to its de jure equivalent, arising from the 
implementation by the CJEU of existing justifications and the level of scrutiny associated to each 
protected ground, and partially linked to its underlying rationale. This de facto hierarchy also stems from 
the references made by national courts that vary for each protected ground. Combined, the de jure and 
de facto hierarchies create an uneven equality protection which is problematic for the EU. At the same 
time, this hierarchy of multiple nature reflects what De Witte calls an “hybrid model”, that is the 
“construction of a distinct multilevel governance regime in the field of antidiscrimination [that] 
combines the strengths of the rights approach with those of an experimental governance agenda.”197 
Conclusion: A tale of two diverging rationales, reconciled in a hybrid but effective 
principle 
Despite a new rationale promoting a genuine protection of equality as a fundamental right, few 
references to the Charter as a primary source of law have been made. It seems that the CJEU is 
privileging a pragmatic approach in order to avoid a controversy similar to what happened in Germany 
after Mangold. While non-discrimination law has lately been vested with the dimension of a 
fundamental right, and its underlying narrative has changed, this has affected the actual content of non-
discrimination rights in a minor way. In fact, in the hands of the EU, non-discrimination law remains 
obviously anchored in the market, guaranteeing market access rights as the core of its equality protection. 
This ensures that non-discrimination law remains within the scope of EU law, and at the same time 
covers important parts of the typical subset of social relationships – work and consumption –, especially 
in the case of race and gender, protected both within the labour market and in the access to goods and 
services. However, non-discrimination law punctually goes beyond the market, as in the case of the 
protection from racial discrimination. This is very far-reaching and probably extends to the very limits 
of what EU law can do in terms of equality protection. The fact that the adoption of the Race Equality 
Directive was unusually consensual indeed accounts for its exceptional character and the absence of 
challenge based on arguments related to a lack of EU competence. This taken into consideration, as well 
as the exceptional architecture dedicated to the protection of gender equality, allied to the current 
backlash and ongoing scepticism against the EU, casts serious doubts on the possibility of further 
legislative reforms in the near future. By way of illustration, despite the eight-year-long negotiations of 
the proposal for a so-called horizontal directive (2008 until today), and despite continuously renewed 
efforts to reach an agreement, the reform has consistently been blocked in the absence of unanimity. 
Besides, uncertainties remain as regards the place of the Charter and its wide range of protected 
                                                 
194 They concerned for instance the definitions of the grounds, the exclusion from benefits of same-sex partners, etc. In the case 
of race, it could also be explained by the political unwillingness to challenge EU competences as granted by Directive 
2000/43/EC or that the protection reflects protection already granted by national law. 
195 See (nr. 72) and (nr. 74). 
196 These are the landmark case C-236/09 Test-Achats, which has however given rise to a small revolution (see nr. 38); and C-
318/13 X according to the CURIA search database. No comprehensive search was run on the basis of the existing 6 
directives and relevant Treaty provisions for gender non-discrimination, but the amount of preliminary references is very 
high, as the legislation has been available for a much longer period of time. 
197  De Witte, 'New Institutions for Promoting Equality in Europe: Legal Transfers, National Bricolage and European 
Governance', 73 
Raphaële Xenidis 
32 Department of Law Working Papers 
categories under the developing general principle of non-discrimination. The reach and boundaries of 
non-discrimination law are therefore blurry, and the non-discrimination battle seems to have lost priority. 
This is problematic in light of the uneven nature of the present protection, which privileges certain 
identity traits over others. At the current stage, the EU is a more legally protected place for women and 
people of colour than for gays or persons with disabilities. The tacit nature of hierarchies in equality 
protection – result of political backlash, and not of an explicit political and societal debate – gives wrong 
signals in terms of prioritisation of values. One necessary next step for the EU to take, within its 
competence, is therefore to extend market access rights to level off the protection of all grounds. 
However, the pushback has led to different make up solutions, such as a more bottom-up and horizontal 
enforcement through the national equality bodies, or the interpretation of the binding Charter in the 
hands of the CJEU. In fact, as a fundamental right, equality – or its negative form non-discrimination – 
is also a general principle towards which the Treaty, the Charter, the directives, the various international 
conventions and the member states’ constitutional traditions converge. The general principle of non-
discrimination is therefore a powerful weapon in the hands of the Court’s judges to fight against 
inequalities. Due to its controversial nature, it still tends to remain a solution of last resort, yet represents 
a safeguard for the Union’s equal citizenship, and could prove an instrument at the Court’s disposal to 
act against rising intolerance. The general principle of non-discrimination could also be used as a tool 
to level up the currently hierarchical protection of equality. In a period of multi-facetted crisis, the very 
blurriness of the potential boundaries of non-discrimination law could deal as an opportunity to give 
strong and reassuring signals regarding the centrality of equality and tolerance in a pluralistic society 
such as the EU. Hence, in the near future, non-discrimination law has the power to prove a double-edged 
sword, triggering controversy at the member states’ level, but also fulfilling the crucial function of a 
supranational protection of some of the core values of EU citizenship. However, the latest signals given 
by the Court of Justice show more restraint than bravery, confirming the dissonance between a bold 
discourse depicting the EU as a human rights promoter and the very functional nature of the EU legal 
order. 
  
Shaking the normative foundations of EU equality law… 
Department of Law Working Papers 33 
Annex 
Listing of references for preliminary ruling based on Directive 2000/78/EC  
and Directive 2000/43/EC 
This annex presents the results and search procedure linked to the listing and analysis of all references 
for preliminary ruling made based on Directive 2000/78/EC and Directive 2000/43/EC contained in Part 
III. 3) B. It contains all preliminary references for closed cases publicly available from the CURIA 
website. No search combination has yielded satisfactory results in terms of the preliminary references 
based on directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC in pending cases. The charts thus show the relevant 
pending cases found so far, but its systematisation is work in progress, as it requires searching for 
references to the two directives through the approximately 900 cases that are currently pending in front 
of the Court. Nevertheless, the following tables give a good overview of the architecture of references 
for preliminary ruling. 
 RPR: reference for preliminary ruling 
 In bold: references for pending and joined cases that did not appear in the various searches on the 
CURIA website 
 NB: several references can appear as joined cases in the same box 
 
Directive 2000/78/EC 
# Age Disability 
Religion 
Belief 
Sexual 
orientation 
Multiple 
Unknown 
ground 
#1 2004 
C-144/04 Mangold 
(RPR from Germany) 
2005 
C-13/05 
Chacón 
Navas (RPR 
from Spain) 
2015 
C-157/17 
Achbita 
(RPR from 
Belgium) - 
pending 
2006 
C-267/06 Maruko 
(RPR from Germany) 
 
2010 
C-415/10 
Meister (RPR 
from 
Germany) 
 Sex 
 Age 
 Ethnic 
origin 
2010 
C-310/10 
Agafiţei 
and Others 
(RPR from 
Romania) 
 + Race 
#2 2004 
C-261/04 Schmidt 
(RPR from Germany) 
2006 
C-303/06 
Coleman 
(RPR from 
UK) 
2015 
C-188/15  
Bougnaoui 
et ADDH 
(RPR from 
France) - 
pending 
2008 
C-147/08 Römer 
(RPR from Germany) 
2011 
C-152/11 
Odar (RPR 
from 
Germany) 
 Age 
 Disability 
2013 
C-89/13  
D’Aniello 
and Others 
(RPR from 
Italy) 
#3 2005 
C-411/05 Palacios de 
la Villa (RPR from 
Spain) 
 
2011 
Joined cases 
C-335/11 and 
C-337/11 HK 
Danmark 
(RPR from 
Denmark) 
 2011 
Joined cases 
C-124/11, C-125/11 
and C-143/11 
Karen Dittrich and 
Robert Klinke and 
Jörg-Detlef Müller v 
Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (RPR 
from Germany) 
2012 
C-363/12 Z. 
(RPR from 
Ireland) 
 Sex 
 Disability 
2012 
C-361/12 
Carratù 
(RPR from 
Italy) 
#4 2006 
C-87/06 Pascual 
García (RPR from 
Spain – withdrawn 
2012 
C-356/12 
Glatzel (RPR 
 2012 
C-81/12 
Asociația Accept 
(RPR from Romania) 
2015 
C-423/15 
Kratzer (RPR 
2013 
C-22/13 
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after decision in 
Palacios) 
from 
Germany) 
from 
Germany) 
 Sex 
 Age 
Mascolo 
(RPR from 
Italy) 
#5 2006 
C-427/06 Bartsch 
(RPR from Germany) 
2013 
C-354/13 
FOA (Kaltoft) 
(RPR from 
Denmark) 
 2012  
C-267/12 Hay (RPR 
from France) 
2015 
C-443/15 
Parris (RPR 
from Ireland) 
 Age 
 Sexual 
orientation 
2013 
 C-61/13 
Forni (RPR 
from Italy) 
 
#6 2007 
C-388/07 Age 
Concern England 
(RPR from UK) 
2015 
C-198/15 
Invamed 
Group 
and Others 
(RPR from 
UK) 
 2012 
C-610/12 Peter (RPR 
from Germany) 
 2013 
C-62/13 
Racca (RPR 
from Italy) 
 
#7 2007 
C-555/07 
Kücükdeveci (RPR 
from Germany) 
2015 
C-395/15 
Daouidi 
(RPR from 
Spain) 
   2013 
C-63/13 
Russo (RPR 
from Italy) 
#8 2008 
C-88/08 Hütter (RPR 
from Austria) 
2015 
C-406/15 
Milkova (RPR 
from 
Bulgaria) 
   2016 
C-27/16 
Marinkov 
(RPR from 
Bulgaria) 
 + Sex 
#9 2008 
C-229/08 Wolf (RPR 
from Germany) 
2016 
C-270/16 
Carlos 
Enrique Ruiz 
Conejero 
v Ferroser 
Servicios 
Auxiliares 
S.A. and 
Ministerio 
Fiscal (RPR 
from Spain) - 
pending 
    
#10 2008 
C-341/08 Petersen 
(RPR from Germany) 
     
#11 2008 
C-499/08 
Ingeniørforeningen i 
Danmark (RPR from 
Denmark) 
     
#12 2009 
C-45/09 Rosenbladt 
(RPR from Germany) 
     
#13 2009      
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C-109/09 Deutsche 
Lufthansa (RPR from 
Germany) 
#14 2009 
C-246/09 Bulicke 
(RPR from Germany) 
     
#15 2009 
Joined cases C-
250/09 and C-268/09 
Georgiev (RPR from 
Bulgaria) 
     
#16 2009 
C-447/09 Prigge 
and Others (RPR 
from Germany) 
     
#17 2010 
C-86/10 Balaban 
(RPR from Germany) 
     
#18 2010 
Joined cases C-
159/10 Fuchs and C-
160/10 Köhler (RPR 
from Germany) 
     
#19 2010 
Joined cases C-
297/10 Hennigs and 
C-298/10 Mai (RPR 
from Germany) 
     
#20 2011 
C-132/11 Tyrolean 
Airways Tiroler 
Luftfahrt (RPR from 
Austria) 
     
#21 2011 
C-141/11 Hörnfeldt 
(RPR from Sweden) 
     
#22 2011 
C-266/11 Frandsen 
(RPR from Denmark) 
     
#23 2011 
C-476/11 HK 
Danmark (RPR from 
Denmark) 
     
#24 2011 
C-546/11 Dansk 
Jurist- og 
Økonomforbund 
(RPR from Denmark) 
     
#25 2012 
C-429/12 Pohl (RPR 
from Austria) 
     
#26 2012 
Joined cases 
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C-501/12 Specht, 
C-502/12 Schombra, 
C-503/12 Wieland, 
C-504/12 
Schönefeld,  
C-505/12 Wilke, 
C-506/12 Schini, 
C-540/12 Schmeel, 
C-541/12 Schuster 
(RPR from Germany) 
#27 2013 
C-20/13 Unland 
(RPR from Germany) 
     
#28 2013 
C-416/13 Vital Pérez 
(RPR from Spain) 
     
#29 2013 
C-417/13 Starjakob 
(RPR from Austria) 
     
#30 2013 
C-515/13 
Ingeniørforeningen i 
Danmark (RPR from 
Denmark) 
     
#31 2013 
C-520/13 Leśniak - 
Jaworska and 
Głuchowska – 
Szmulewicz (RPR 
from Poland) 
     
#32 2013 
C-529/13 Felber 
(RPR from Austria) 
     
#33 2013 
C-530/13 Schmitzer 
(RPR from Austria) 
     
#34 C-262/14 SCMD 
(RPR from Romania) 
     
#35 2014  
C-432/14 O v. Bio 
(RPR from France) 
     
#36 2014  
C-441/14 DI (RPR 
from Denmark) 
     
#37 2015  
C-122/15 C (RPR 
from Finland) 
     
#38 2015 
C-159/15 Lesar 
(RPR from Austria) 
     
#39 2015       
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C-258/15 Salaberria 
Sorondo (RPR from 
Spain) 
#40 2015 
C-539/15 Bowman 
(RPR from Austria) 
     
#41 2015  
C-548/15 De Lange 
(RPR from the 
Netherlands) 
     
Total 51 RPR 10 RPR 2 RPR 8 RPR 5 RPR 8 RPR 
Total 84 RPR 
 
 
 
# 
Directive 2000/43/EC 
Race and ethnic origin 
#1 
2004 
Case-328/04 Vajnai (RPR from Hungary) 
#2 
2007 
C-54/07 Feryn (RPR from Belgium) 
#3 
2009 
C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn (RPR from Lithuania) 
#4 
2010 
C-310/10 Agafiţei and Others (RPR from Romania) 
 Directive 2000/78/EC 
#5 
2010 
C-415/10 Meister (RPR from Germany) 
 Age 
 Sex 
#6 
2010 
C-571/10 Kamberaj (RPR from Italy) 
#7 
2011 
C-394/11 Belov (RPR from Bulgaria) 
#8 
2014 
C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria (RPR from Bulgaria) 
#9 
2015 
C-668/15 Jyske Finans A/S (RPR from Denmark) - pending 
 Race 
 Nationality 
 
 
 
Search procedure: 
This data was obtained by doing a search on the CURIA database with the following criteria:  
 Period or date = "All types of dates"; period= "from 01/01/2000 to 10/01/2017"  
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 Court = "Court of Justice"  
 References to case-law or legislation = [Search in = "Grounds of judgment, Operative part"; 
Category = "Directive"; Number = "78"; Year = "2000"; ]  
 Documents = Documents published in the ECR : Orders - Information (on unpublished 
decisions) 
Documents not published in the ECR : Orders (All) 
Notices published in OJ : Cases brought 
Period from 01/01/2000 to 11/01/2017  
It gave 103 results,198 which I all filtered (selecting only the applications) and classified per ground 
invoked in order to find out the amount of national references for preliminary ruling made for each 
directive and for each ground. I eliminated all cases which were not national references for preliminary 
ruling, checked if references that had been treated as joined cases did not appear in the search and add 
them where applicable, and filtered out all applications that appeared but did not mention directive 
2000/78/EC in their questions to the Court.199 The search does not show the preliminary references that 
have not yet been decided on by the Court. As a consequence, the two existing religious discrimination 
cases did not appear in the search, as well as preliminary references concerning discrimination on 
grounds of ethnicity and disability (in bold in the Annex). 
I combined this search with larger searches run based on less restricting criteria in order to avoid missing 
anything, as the search tool of the CURIA website poses some issues in terms of exhaustiveness. 
One example is the following search, which gave 227 results, which I filtered according to the same 
procedure as for the first search. The criteria are as follows200: 
 Period or date = "Date of the lodging of the application initiating proceedings"; period= "from 
01/01/2000 to 23/01/2017"  
 References to case-law or legislation = [ Search in = "Grounds of judgment, Operative part, 
Opinion"; Category = "Directive"; Number = "78"; Year = "2000"; ]  
 Documents = Documents published in the ECR : Orders - Information (on unpublished 
decisions) 
Documents not published in the ECR : Orders ( All ) 
Notices published in OJ : Cases brought - Cases closed 
Period from 01/01/2000 to 23/01/2017  
Search procedure for the pending cases on non-discrimination matters: http://curia.europa.eu 
/juris/liste.jsf?pro=&lgrec=en&nat=or&oqp=&dates=&lg=&language=en&jur=C%2CT%2CF&cit=no
ne%252CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%25
2C%252C%252Ctrue%252Cfalse%252Cfalse&td=%3BALL&pcs=Oor&avg=&page=1&mat=DISC
%252Cor&etat=pend&jge=&for=&cid=478994 
I repeated the search for Directive 2000/43/EC on race discrimination with the same criteria, just 
changing the directive number (and the corresponding CELEX number).  
                                                 
198 The link for this search is: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?page=1&pro=&lgrec=en&nat=or&oqp=&dates=%2524type%253Dpro%2524
mode%253DfromTo%2524from%253D2000.01.01%2524to%253D2017.01.10&lg=&language=en&jur=C&cit=L%252
CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C2000%252C78%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252Ctru
e%252Ctrue%252Cfalse&td=%24mode%3DfromTo%24from%3D2000.01.01%24to%3D2017.01.11%3B%3B%3BPUB
2%2CPUB6%3BNPUB2%3BCOM1%3BORDALL&pcs=Oor&avg=&mat=or&jge=&for=&cid=510252 
199  These cases are C-268/06 Impact, C-17/05 Cadman, C-227/04 Lindorfer, C-55/07 Michaeler and Subito, C-73/07 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, C-73/08 Bressol, C-101/08 Audiolux, C-123/10 Brachner, C-282/10 
Dominguez, C-617/11 P Marcuccio v. Commission, C-5/12 Betriu Montull, C-38/13 Nierodzik, and C-311-13 Tümer. 
200 The date is later in time, but this did not change anything in terms of recent results. 
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